John Marshall.
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DARTMOUTH COLLEGE v. WOODWARD. tion of that amendment. And it should fur Of all Marshall's decisions the one most ther be said that the reasoning in Marshall's frequently doubted in this State (New Hamp opinion tends irresistibly to the same conclu shire) is that in the Dartmouth College case. sion. His opinion is very strong to the point No lawyer likes to be compelled to choose that the Trustees of the college have a locus between the conflicting views of two such standi in court to question the validity of the jurists as Richardson and Marshall. It seems amendatory statutes, and also to the point presumptuous to differ from either; still more that the amendments have the effect of to so to differ from both. And yet I, for one, tally changing the system of managing the am inclined to say that both these great corporate affairs, substituting the will of the Judges were wrong; that while each was State for the will of the donor. His error, right on some points, yet each was wrong on if error there was, is in the assertion that the other points; that Richardson erred when he grant of a corporate charter involves a con held that the amendatory statutes were not tract on the part of the State, within the in violation of the Constitution of New meaning of the above quoted clause of the Hampshire, and that Marshall erred when United States Constitution. That Marshall made occasional mistakes he held that these statutes were in violation of the Constitution of the United States. In may be safely admitted without seriously de other words, I incline to indorse the views tracting from his judicial reputation. After on this subject expressed by Judge Doe in making all reasonable allowance for errors, his opinion in Dow v. Northern R. R., 67 the fact remains that these errors are very few in proportion to the whole number of N. H. I, pp. 27-53. (Also printed, in sub stance, in 6 Harvard Law Review, 161 and his decisions. We doubt whether, in any de 213, under the title "A New View of the partment of human effort, another modern Dartmouth College Case.") Judge Doe instance can be found of one who had to thinks that the State had power to revoke travel over a new country, blazing his path through an hitherto unexplored forest, and the charter; but had not power to take con trol of the corporate property. He believes yet lost his way so seldom or left behind him so few erroneous guideposts to mislead pos that the State's attempt to control the man agement of the trust funds is in conflict with terity.1 the provisions of the State Constitution rela GIBBONS v. OGDEX. tive to deprivation of property, immunities As a striking example of the extensive or privileges. So far as the State Constitu tion is concerned, there appears to be no and beneficent influence and operation of Marshall's constitutional decisions, I select satisfactory answer to the powerful argu ment of Mr. Mason, which is fully reported what is known as the New York steamboat in the reprint of the Dartmouth College case case (reported under the name of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton's Reports, i). This was in 65 N. H., 473-497. To avoid misappre hension, it should be added that the only ¡ decided in 1824. It is the first case that con clause in the United States Constitution strued, in any important particular, the com merce clause of the Constitution. It is a wellwhich was then under discussion is the pro known historical fact that the most efficient hibition against the passage of laws "impair ing the obligation of contracts." The case cause of the formation of the Union which was decided long before the adoption of the resulted from the Constitution of the United Fourteenth Amendment. The reasoning of States was the selfish and conflicting regula tions of the different States in respect of both Mr. Mason and Judge Doe clearly dem onstrates that the New Hampshire statutes commerce, each trying to secure an advan of 1816. if enacted to-day, would be in viola 1 Professor Smith.
