indestructible union of indestructible States became a tangible and inspiring entity, ap pealing alike to the affections and the reason of men, and in it, thus far at least, they have seen both the ark of their safety and an ideal for which willingly to lay down their lives.1 In most of Marshall's opinions, one ob serves the style and the special touch of a thoughtful and original mind; in some of them the powers of a great mind, in full activity. His cases relating to international law, as I am assured by those competent to judge, rank with the best there are in the books. As regards most of the more familiar titles of the law, it would be too much to claim for him the very first rank. In that region he is, in many respects, equalled or surpassed by men of greater learning, and, men, if I may use the phrase, who were more deeply saturated in the technicalities of the law, that "artificial perfection of reason" of which Coke talks — such as Story, Kent, or Shaw; and even the reformer, Mansfield, whom he greatly admired, Eldon, or Black burn. But in the field of constitutional law, and especially in one department of it, that relating to the National Constitution, he was pre-eminent, first, with no one second. It is hardly possible, as regards this part of the law, to say too much of the service he ren dered to his country. Sitting in the high est judicial place for more than a genera tion; familiar, from the beginning, with the Federal Constitution, with the purposes of its framers, and with all the objections of its critics; accustomed to meet these objections from the time he had served in the Virginia Convention of 1788, convinced of the pur pose and capacity of this instrument to cre ate a strong nation, competent to make itself respected at home and abroad, and able to speak with the voice and to strike with the strength of all; assured that this was the paramount necessity of the country, and that the great source of danger was in the jeal1 Honorable Richard OIney, of Boston; formerly Secre tary of State.
ousies and adverse interests of the States, Marshall acted on his convictions. He de termined to give full effect to all the affirma tive contributions of power that went to make up a great and efficient national govern ment; and fully, also, to enforce the national restraints and prohibitions upon the States. In both cases he included not only the pow ers expressed in the Constitution, but those also which should be found, as time un folded, to -be fairly and clearly implied in the objects for which the Federal Govern ment was established. In that long judicial life, with which Providence blessed him, and blessed his country, he was able to lay down in a succession of cases the fundamental con siderations which fix and govern the rela tive functions of the nation and the States, so plainly, with such fullness, with such sim plicity and strength of argument, such a can did allowance for all that was to be said upon the other side, in a tone so removed from controversial bitterness, so natural and fit for a great man addressing the "serene reason" of mankind — as to commend these things to the minds of his countrymen, and firmly to fix them in the jurisprudence of the nation: so that when the rain descended and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat upon that house, it fell not, because it was founded upon a rock. It was Marshall's strong constitutional doctrine, explained in detail, elaborated, powerfully argued, over and over again, with unsurpassable earnest ness and force, placed permanently in our judicial records, holding its own during the long emergence of a feebler political theory, and showing itself in all its majesty when war and civil dissension came—it was largely this that saved the country from succumb ing in the great struggle of forty years ago, and kept our political fabric from going to pieces. I do not forget our own Webster, or others, in saying that to Marshall (if we may use his own phrase about Washington) "more than to any other individual, and as much as to one individual was possible," do we owe that prevalence of sound constitu
