chosen by the people, and unsettles the nation's policy, both foreign and domestic. In short, the killing of a President is a breach of the peace of the whole United States. Hence this crime should not be punished, as now, exclusively in state courts and under the varying statutes of the states —statutes that classify homicide in divers ways, and that provide as the maximum punishment in California death by hanging, and in New York death by electricity, and in Maine perpetual imprisonment; but the crime should be punished under federal statutes and in federal courts and with con sequent uniformity of penalty. What should the crime be called? Not treason. The Constitution says: "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and com fort." The Constitution further provides, as will be well to bear in mind further along in this discussion, that "No person shall be con victed of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." This careful definition of treason and of the proof neces sary for conviction indicates clearly that the framers of the Constitution kept in mind the history- of England, and realized that, as Madison says in The Federalist, "New fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free government, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on each other." Even if it were desirable, it would be practically impossible to-day to amend the Constitution by creating new kinds of treason. Without amending the Constitution there is a possible and desirable remedy, namely, a statutory provision similar to the one now punishing conspiracies to prevent any person from accepting any office under the United States or from discharging the duties thereof. Let there be a new statute punishing any person who prevents, or attempts to prevent, the President, Vice-Président, any member
of the Cabinet, any Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Circuit Court or of the Dis trict Court, or any member of either House of Congress, or any person elected or ap pointed to any one of these offices, from accepting or holding such office, or from discharging the duties thereof. Let the punifhment for causing death in such cases be identical with the punishment for murder. Let the punishment for smaller injuries and for attempts be imprisonment for a term of years or for life, in the discretion of the judge. Let the punishment of accessories be identical with that of principals. The filling out of this sketch will furnish a series of provisions coming within the constitutional powers of Congress and placing the pro tection of high federal officials in the hands of the federal courts. There remains the most dangerous ques tion of all. What shall be done with the person who has committed no overt act? May the anarchist without restriction spread doctrines directly or indirectly counseling assassination? The nation certainly is under no obligation to admit an immigrant holding anarchistic opinions; and, although it is difficult to define such opinions with ac curacy, it seems advisable to exact from immigrants an oath to the effect that so long as they remain in the United States they will obey the laws of the nation and of the State and of the municipality, and will recognize the authority of all legally constituted officials. The nation is also under no obliga tion to transmit by public machinery publi cations subversive of its own existence, or even publications of an immoral nature; and hence it is proper enough to exclude anar chistic literature from the mails. These remedies, however, are obviously inadequate to prevent the dissemination of anarchistic opinions. Can anything else be done? Yes; it is practicable to punish with fine or im prisonment anyone who makes threats or who counsels violence; but, as it is not expedient to encourage martyrdom, it would be preferable to adopt some less spectacular
