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The Green Bag.

bar Lindley spent six years as a judge in the Court of Common Pleas, and thus came to the Court of Appeal thoroughly equipped. Had other judges been equally well trained Lord Selborne's original scheme for the con solidation of law and equity might have been realized. As it happened Lord Lindley found his sphere of usefulness in the chancery division of the Court of Appeal, where for twenty years his very accurate and methodi cal mind set a high standard of efficiency for his associates. His great eminence is the result of conscientious labor and an apparent belief that a lawyer's educa tion is never finished. As a specialist he completely mastered the law relating to companies and the law of partnership. Lord Lindley is a self-made man; but he must have been born with legal instincts, for he takes rank with associates whose academical distinctions lend a glitter to their legal eminence. His opinions are logical, compre hensive and convincing, and the only criti cism that the most captious can make is that when any of his brethren dissent he is apt to wander off in all the by-paths of the subject in his evident desire to fortify his own conclusion.1 Fry was one of the greatest technical masters of equity in recent times and con tributed materially to the high standard of the court.2 Few laymen have found the law reports 1 R. v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63; The Bernina, 12 P. D. 58; Angus v. Clifford, 6 App. Cas. 779; Scaramanga v. Stamp, 4 С. P. D. 316; Hollins v. Memey, 13 Q. B. D. 305; Tod Heatley z/. Benham, 40 Ch. D. 97; Dashwood v. Magniac (1891), 3 Ch. 306; Allcard v. Skinner, 36 Ch. D., 145; Maxim-Nordenfelt case (1893), I Ch. 631; Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893), i Q. B. 265; Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Gas. 740; Smith v. Chadwick, 20 Ch. D. 67; Stuart v. Bell, 64 L. T. 633; Reddaway v. Hemp Spinning Co., 67 do. 301; Whit wood Chemical Co. v. Hardman, 64 do. 716; Re Piercy, 78 do. 277; Re Perry Almshouses, 79 do. 366; Lyons v. Wilkins, 79 do. 709; Pemberton v. Hughes, 80 do. 592; Low v. Bonvière, 65 do. 533; McClatchie v. Hasham, 65 do. 691; Ballard v. Tomlinson, 52 do. 942; White v. White, 62 L. J-, Ch. 342; Lemmon v. Webb, 63 do. 570; Hudson v. Ashby, 65 do. 515; Powell z>. Birne Vinegar Co., 65 do. 563; Macduff v. Mactluff, 65 do. 700; Hardackerz*. Dis trict Council, 65 L. J., Q. B. 363; Speight v. Gaunt, 22 Ch. D. 727. a Cochrane v. Moore 25 Q. В. П. 57; Davies v. Davies, 36 Ch. D., 359; Northern Counties Fire Ins. v. Whipp,

entertaining reading. Lord Bowen is probably the only judge in the present generation whose work has commanded buch an audience. The reason is not far to seek. Besides grasp of principle, breadth of view and cogent reasoning, the style is so lucid, the illustrative matter so aptly chosen, the analogies so dextrously handled, the whole fabric of the exposition so admirably articulated, that he may be said to have combined, to an extent unsur passed in English law, legal learning and literary form. He had a refreshing con ception of intellectual reserve, a fine sense of proportion and wholesome mental habits of discrimination; and he expounded the his torical evolution of legal principles in a style so pure, accurate and distinguished that it appeals to all persons of cultivated taste. The law, to Lord Bowen, was not a mere collection of rules. "There is no magic at all in formalities," he said. He recognized, to use his own language, the duty of endeavor ing to apply legal doctrines so as to meet "the broadening wants or requirements of a growing country, and the gradual illumina tion of the public conscience." In the course of a bold application of an established prin ciple he said: "It is not a valid objection to a legal doctrine that it will not be always easy to know whether the doctrine is to be applied in a particular case. The law has to face such embarrassments. . . . The in stance to which the legal principle is now for the first time adopted by this court may be new, but the principle is old and sound : and the English law is expansive, and will apply old principles, if need requires it, to new contingencies. Just as, in America, the law of watercourses and of waste has modified itself to suit the circumstances of enormous rivers and wide tracts of uncultivated forests, so the English law accommodates itself to 26 do. 482; Miles v. New Zealand Co. 32 do. 266; Nitro-Phosphate Co. v. London Decks Co., 9 do. soj! Fritz v. Hobson, 14 do. 42; Smith v. Chadwick, 20 Ch. D. 67; Dalton v. Angus, 6 App. Cas. 740; Roussilon v. Roussilon, 14 Ch. D. 358; Salmon v. Warner, 65 L. T. 132; Walter v. Everard, 65 do. 445; Wallis v. Smith, 47 do. 389; Campania de Mocambique v. British So. Africa Co., 66 do. 773; R. v. Jackson, 64 do. 679.