abandoned for the time, being postponed until a witness might know more about the matter. The applicant's counsel offered a state ment from a magazine article, purporting to have been written by Admiral Sampson,, which, after discussion, was withdrawn. Then the witness under examination in answering a question said: "That was the day that Admiral Sampson told me that his information 'said it [the Spanish fleet] was there" [at Santiago]. At this point Mr. Stayton appeared in be half of Admiral Sampson, and handed a com munication to the court. The president read it and said that they would answer it later, and that pending the answer Mr. Sayton could not remain within the bar, but could remain outside, that is to say, not tak ing part in the proceedings. Thereupon Mr. Stayton withdrew. Upon the close of the testimony of the witness then on the stand, the Judge Advocate read the com munication from Admiral Sampson which requested leave to be represented. The Judge Advocate advised the court that Admiral Sampson was not a party, and that the court had discretion to admit or ex clude his representative. Counsel for the applicant attempted to address the court, but was stopped by the Judge Advocate, who said that counsel could not be heard, that the matter was entirely for the court. Whereupon the court decided that "they cannot appear," and instructed the Judge Advocate to reply to that effect to Admiral Sampson. Mr. Stayton again asked leave to address the court, but was promptly stopped by the president. The Judge Ad vocate read aloud the reply to Admiral Sampson, stating that the court "does not at this time regard you as a party." Later, counsel for Rear-Admiral Schley inquired, "Did you mean to include the sub sequent vessels that went there under Ad miral Sampson?" This question, while legi timate for the purpose of clearness, seemed
to be intended to emphasize the fact that the applicant was not the only commanding offi cer who omitted to use every effort to de stroy the "Colon" before the final battle. Mr. Rayner offered to prove that the blockade by the applicant was the same as to distance as that by the commander-inchief after his arrival, also that the com mander-in-chief failed to do his utmost against the "Colon" when he arrived and found her at the mouth of the harbor. But the court excluded both matters as irrele vant to the investigation concerning the ap plicant. Mr. Rayner asked a witness "when the circular form of blockade was commenced?" The Judge Advocate objected. The court, took a recess and, upon returning, the president said that questions upon the blockade of Santiago must be confined to the time before the arrival of the commander-in-chief. When Mr. Rayner asked a witness whether smoke near the harbor of Santiago on July 2 was communicated to the squadron, the Judge Advocate inquired whether that concerned the conduct of the applicant. Mr. Rayner stated what he wished to prove. Whereupon the Judge Advocate said that if counsel does that he should be sworn. Afterwards the Judge Advocate consented to the questions being asked on condition that counsel would "stop at once. The witness answered as to smoke having been seen on July 2, and that it was his "im pression" that the fact was communicated to the commander-in-chief, Admiral Sampson. A question by the applicant's counsel as to what vessels were in sight at the begin ning of the battle was objected to by the government as not in the specifications, and was withdrawn for "the present." Before the cross-examination of the ap plicant by the Judge Advocate, the court ruled that questions be confined to the time between the 19th of May and the 1st of June, when he was actually commander-in-chief. The court said that if there was delay be
