example, a Maritime State,, will not be equally convenient, perhaps will be injurious, to the interests of another State. Unfortunately, that is not all. There exists an uneasy suspicion that International Tribu nals do not approach the questions before them with the same complete impartiality that obtains in our own Courts of Justice. This feeling is partly due to the fact that the universal confidence in the administration of justice at home which we feel here does not obtain in all foreign countries. I recollect once discussing this subject with one of the greatest judges outside the British domin ions. He told me that if a quarrel arose be tween his country and mine, so persuaded was he of the purity of British justice, that he would be prepared to submit that differ ence to three British judges. But it is not so everywhere. And inasmuch as the final de cision in any International Tribunal rests with a foreigner, the bias of patriotism, the prepossession in favor of the interests of his own country may, even unconsciously, sway his mind. Governments are very sensitive upon such points, and naturally so. Every arbitration is watched most closely, and the cause of peace 's immensely injured by any miscarriage or supposed miscarriage of jus tice. It cannot be said that the Alabama Award, for example, was an encouraging precedent. The damages awarded against Great Britain were so excessive that the United States Government were unable to find claimants for the whole sum. Nothing can be more ruinous to the prospect of Intertional Arbitration than the slightest suspicion of prejudice among the arbitrators; and unHappily there has been a great deal of such suspicion. These then are the difficulties which we shall do well to recognize. We have to deal with voluntary litigants, with uncertain rules to guide us, in an atmosphere charged with suspicion and with national pride. Beyond all this there is a great limitation
to be borne in mind, a limitation so great that it leads fainter spirits almost to despair. There are many subjects of quarrel, and those the most explosive, which, from the nature of them, we cannot hope at present to see composed by arbitration. They arise not from differences on law or on fact, but from conflicts of national policy. Let me use a few illustrations drawn from foreign coun tries or from history so far ancient that it provokes no controversy today. I strictly avoid any illustration that may cause con troversy. In the Crimean War. the origin of dispute nominally concerned the Holy Places in Palestine. Really the question which resulted in war was the old antag onism between the interests of Russia and the interests of Turkey. The nominal ques tion might well have been settled by arbitra tion had there been good-will and a desire for settlement. The real question was beyond any such solution. Or take the American Civil "ar. There was the long and bitter dispute about slavery, which became associated with a conflict be tween State authority and Federal authority. In the end it came to the point whether the United States was to be one power in future or not. Perhaps the slavery question might have been determined peacefully on the foot ing of purchase. It is difficult to suppo?e that the Constitutional question could have been settled by any peaceful adjudication. Again, the Franco-German War arose from the pretensions of a Hohenzo'ilern Prince to advancement in a foreign country, but in the background there was a sense of rivalry between France and Germany, and an irritation on both sides rooted in old his tory and unappeased by the lapse of many years. In 1886 fears were entertained lest that war might be renewed. The danger arose partly, at least, from a belief in Ger many that France was arming for revenge. Happily, war was averted; but not by arbi tration. All efforts of that kind would have
