ants of the ruin known as 'The Mill.'" Mr. Brier in his petition alleges that Mt. Vernon Davis got the best of his father. The jury found that he did it to the extent of $2000, from which finding this appeal is taken. BUT, you must admit," said the masculine end of the controversy, "that woman is the weaker vessel." "I'll admit nothing of the sort," rejoined the contrary female. "The mere fact that she seldom has ten be bailed out is proof to the contrary."—Exchange. IN Dr. John Hall's time it was the custom in his church to use the old-fashioned simple hymns (says The Canadian Lav.' Review), and the singing was congregational. On one oc casion William M. Evarts discovered E. Delafield Smith, then corporation counsel of New York City, singing with all his heart, and whispered to his friend: "Why, there is Smith singing, 'I want to be an angel.' I knew he wanted to be district attorney, but I didn't know he wanted to be an angel." The remark was repeated to Mr. Smith, and quick as a flash came the retort: "No, I have never mentioned the matter to Evarts, knowing he had no influence in that direc tion." JUSTICE GAYNOR of the Supreme Court of New York has a reputation for dry sayings not altogether devoid of humor, and two which are going the rounds among lawyers are these: A petition for an injunction, based upon somewhat doubtful assertions of fact, recent ly came before the justice. After considering the affidavit of the petitioner, he remarked: "In this case an Injunction will not lie, even if the relator does." Under circumstances somewhat similar, an attorney sought to discredit statements con tained in an affidavit. "But counsel should remember." observed Judge Gaynor, "that the truth sometimes will out, even in an affidavit."—.Yra1 York Times.
ACCORDING to one of the unwritten laws of the Constitution, the President of the Repub lic may not leave French territory while the Chambers are in session. One reason for this rule undoubtedly is to be found in the fact that the President is not merely an or namental functionary, but an active partici pant in various departments of Government; for example, he usually presides at Cabinet Councils, and in this and other ways brings his influence effectually to bear on matters of State. The rule, moreover, reminds us that for a brief period in our own history the Sovereign could not leave the British isles without the consent of Parliament. This prohibition, contained in the Act of Settle ment, was aimed at possible entanglements arising out of the Hanoverian connection; it was, however, very short-lived, being re pealed in the first year of the reign of George I., "whose frequent journeys to Hanover," says Hallam, "were an abuse of the graciousness with which the Parliament consented to annul the restriction."— The Law Times. IN a recent Quain lecture, Mr. John Macdonell traversed a very wide and interesting field—judicial procedure in Athens, in later Rome, in the mediaeval Church Courts under the canon law, and in modern Germany. Such a comparative survey leaves on the mind an impression of much, and often strik ing, similarity in the midst of dissimilarity. For example, what could present a closer or more curious parallel in the growth of equity than the Roman praetors' formulas modifying the old actioncs legis and our Eng lish Chancellors' jurisdiction supplementing the old common-law writs. The very dissi milarity is interesting1 because it shows how each system of judicial procedure reflects the idiosyncrasies of national temperament. In democratic Athens the procedure was popu lar: the jury system ran through it all. It was the city that administered justice, just as it was the city which governed itself and made treaties. In Rome the conservative bias of the Roman mind, its strict adherence to technicality and form, gave a peculiar rig
