The Recognition of Panama and Its Results. the near future, to coerce the revolutionary body. Thus time is the essence of the ques tion,—time for testing the new State's sta bility, its popular backing, its freedom from outside control, its independence as an as sured fact. For instance, when the South American colonies revolted from Spain early in the last century, the United States government al lowed twelve years to elapse before recogni • tion of their independence. In support of the rule for recognition given above it is hardly necessary to cite authori ties. I mention one only, Snow's Manual of International Law (2d éd., pp. 10, n), partly because his phrasing is very apropos, and partly because this manual was published by our government for the use of the navy so lately as 1898. It is therefore the rule which our naval officers would have followed in the case of Panama, had no special instruc tions superseded it. "When a rebellious community has prac tically attained its end, which is independ ence, and the mother country has ceased military operations against it, then, if the government and institutions of the new State appear regular and stable, it is recognized by third States as an independent State and a member of the family of nations. ..." "The usage of International Law in refer ence to the recognition of the independence of a State is that when the war for its sub jugation has practically ceased and that it has a stable government the proper time has arrived. The commencement of a State as a subject nf international law dates from this recognition of independence by existing States. ..." "Cases have occurred where third States have recognized the independence of a rebel lious community prematurely, but such rec ognition has been generally followed by a declaration of war by the parent State upon the ground that such action places the third State in the position of an ally to the rebel
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lious community, and hence of an enemy to the parent State. The alliance of France and the United States in 1778 is a case in point. John Quincy Adams gives a safe rule when he says: 'The justice of a cause, however it may enlist individual feelings in its favor, is not sufficient to justify third parties in siding with it. The fact and the right combined can alone authorize a neutral to acknowl edge a new and disputed sovereignty.' To "have sufficient claim, then, for recognition as a separate nationality a community should have the attributes of a sovereign State. It should possess and control a fixed territory, within which there is a definitely organized government, ruling in a civilized manner, controlling the obedience of its citizens or subjects and duly authorized by them to carry on dealings with the existing sovereign States." Judged by this standard, its own standard, our government, by recognizing the new State of Panama within ten days of its seces sion, as possessed of sovereignty although sans a constitution, sans a government, sa:ч a definite status, sans everything, gave to Colombia cause for war. Its further act for bidding and preventing, by show of force, ihe parent State from trying to coerce its re bellious portion, was an act of war, so far as the general principles of international law are in question. So clear is this conclusion, that it is hardly necessary to give further attention to it. It is but beating the air. For the administra tion does not try to justify its action under general law, but rather by an appeal to spe cific treaty provision. This is contained in the thirty-fifth article of the treaty of 1846 with New Granada, to whose rights and duties the United States of Colombia has suc ceeded. By this treaty, certain privileges of import and navigation were granted, in Articles 4, 5 and 6. In addition, by Article 35 the citi zens, vessels and merchandise of the United
