The Judicial History of Individual Liberty. private redress do not come within the term. Acting upon this logical distinction between general and particular purposes, but regard less of the fact that in a majority of cases there was an entire absence of any intention either to depose the sovereign or subvert his government, the judges held trifling insur rections for the purpose of destroying all
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heirs, etc., and should express or declare such intention by publishing any printing or writing or by any overt act or deed, such per son was guilty of treason. The act further declared that it should also be treason to compass or intend (such intention being ex pressed by writing, print or overt act) to depose the king, or to levy war within the
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brothels, or pulling down all dissenting meet ing houses, or to redress real or imaginary national grievances in which the insurgents had no special interest, were constructive levyings of war within the statute. Finally by the statute of 57 George III., c. 6, it was declared that if any person should within the realm or without, compass or intend death or bodily harm or restraint of the king, his
realm in order by force to compel him to change his measures or counsels, or to over come either house of Parliament, or to invite foreign invasion. Neither under this act, however, nor under any judicial construction, were spoken words, as distinguished from words written or published, held to amount to overt acts of treason, unless the words were direct counsellings in furtherance of
