were not for this theory, there could be no international law whatever. . . . As to the question whether or no Mr. Roosevelt has a right to commit an act which amounts to a declaration of war, without the consent of Congress, there is a general dis position to avoid the subject. Almost every one outside of his partisans believes that he has transgressed against the constitution, although no one who prefers the canal to national morality will be offended by a mere breach of the Constitution. IN the December Harvard Law Review Augustine L. Humes discusses "The Power of Congress Over Combinations Affecting Interstate Commerce." After on outline ol "the state of the law and the course of the de cisions of the courts as they stood before the enactment of statutes by Congress and by the Legislatures of the several States con cerning the subject, the existing statutes, particularly the so-called Sherman AntiTrust Act and its construction by the courts," are discussed; and finally there is pointed out "what may yet be accomplished by Con gress in regulating industrial combinations by the exercise of its existing constitutional power." Although "it has been conclusively deter mined by the Supreme Court of the United States that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act re lates only to those contracts, combinations, and conspiracies whose direct and not whose indirect result is to restrain trade or com merce among the several States," that act does not exhaust "the power of Congress to regulate monopolies and contracts, combina tions and conspiracies in restraint of trade. For," says Mr. Humes, "it is believed that Congress has power of regulation over any transaction, cause, or thing whatsoever with in the limits of these United States, includ ing the internal commerce of a State which may be reasonably regarded by it as dele terious to interstate commerce. The power is given to regulate. Regulation means government. Government implies action in a manner that controls. To control, one
must possess the power to control and the means to enforce that power. The power conferred is governmental. It imports as necessary to its efficacy the right to direct the entire matter to which the power relates. Power to control a given subject includes by necessary implication the right by legis lation to promote and restrict it and to de stroy or regulate any factors or causes which may disturb or injuriously affect it. The power of Congress under the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution, in deal ing with contracts, combinations, and con spiracies in restraint of trade among the States, is not limited to regulations of direct restraints of trade and commerce among the States, but also extends to any indirect restraints, no matter to what extent re moved, which might reasonably be consid ered by Congress to affect that commerce. And the question is not as to the policy of the expedient adopted. The sole question for the court is the dry one: Can this affect commerce among the States? As incident to this power of regulation, it is believed that Congress may call to its aid any means that may enable it to act intelligently with a due regard for the rights of the individual and the public and within its constitutional power. One great aid towards this result will be the requirement of publicity in regard to the dealings of individuals and corpora tions engaged in the carrying on of trans actions which may be reasonably considered to be deleterious to the interests of com merce or which may be reasonably regarded as affecting it." IN the Yale Law Journal for December, Hon. Daniel H. Chamberlain, formerly Gov ernor or South Carolina, discusses the Northern Securities Company case, replying to an article on the same subject by Pro fessor С. С. Langdell, in the Harvard Law Reviav for June, 1903. In that article Pro fessor Langdell called in question the de cision of the Circuit court, declaring "that a more iniquitous decree was never made may be asserted with confidence," and
