THE TUCKER TRIAL eign design or coat-of-arms, and all said that they had never seen him wear but one pin of that description. In connection with this testimony, there was an incident which in many ways was one of the most pathetic in the trial, when the defendant's mother, after testifying that she knew it was his pin because she had worn it herself several times, upon being shown by counsel for the defendant the pin in question and another pin somewhat similar but larger and of a different color and different material, pointed out the wrong pin as the one that her son had owned. The Government re plied to this testimony about the pin by offering the negative of a photograph taken of Tucker in a group at a boathouse on the river, wearing the yachting cap referred to, and showing a pin worn in the front of it in the same way the witnesses had de scribed Tucker wearing the pin of which they had spoken. An enlargement of the negative showed that it was an enamel pin in the shape of a shield with a crown on top, but bearing the Spanish coat-of-arms. Thereupon the defence produced the very pin which the photograph represented, and then argued that it was so different from the Canadian pin that the witnesses for the defendant could not have referred to the Spanish pin when they were testifying. If upon this testimony the jury was satisfied that the pin found in Tucker's pocket was Mabel Page's, and after listening to the evidence it is hard to see how they could have arrived at any other result, the con clusion from this point alone that the de fendant was guilty was irresistible. The critics of circumstantial evidence should note that the question whether the pin be longed to Mabel Page or the defendant was settled solely and wholly by direct evi dence. The entire trial was marked with that dignity and solemnity which is a character istic of the Massachusetts courts. There were no theatrical or sensational gallery plays and no unseemly bickerings between
counsel. The case was fairly tried upon the evidence. The defendant was repre sented by able and devoted counsel. There was no attempt made by the prosecution to introduce any detrimental facts of the de fendant's past life. There was a strong current of sympathy for the parents and brother of the accused, which, however, did not warp the judgment of the Court or jury. The jury was a remarkably representa tive one and composed of men who were not afraid to do their duty as they saw it. In the early stages of the trial, the Govern ment was severely criticised for not chal lenging one of the members of the panel, a retired minister. When the Court was questioning the jurors as to their opinions and bias, this juror replied in substance that he would not convict in a capital case un less the evidence was overwhelming, yet that was the type of man that the Govern ment wished to have upon the jury. This murder was one entirely without palliation or excuse, starting with a cowardly blow in the back. If the defendant was guilty, he was guilty in the first degree. There was a strong feeling, however, that the jury might be sufficiently moved by the sympathetic elements in the case to find some way to report a verdict in the second degree; but the jury took the law as it was most clearly given to them by the Court; they had sworn on their oath to give their verdict according to the law upon the evidence, and they did. Theirs was no hasty conclu sion. They returned twice into court for further instructions on the question of what constituted a deliberate murder before they reported their solemn verdict. At the present writing, a motion for new trial is pending, and if that is denied, un questionably the counsel for the defendant will take the exceptions which they saved at the trial to the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth, and possibly to the Su preme Court of the United States. BOSTON, MASS., Feb., 1905.
