RESORT TO THE JUDICIARY application classed with one of vague import. We are to be guided in the application of the uncertain, by its certain associates. The joinder of the doubtful writ with the defined writs operates to interpret and restrict its use, so as to be accepted in the sense of its associates; so that it and they may harmonize in their use for the common purpose for which it is manifest that they were all given. And thus for this use and for this purpose, the constitu tion puts the writ of injunction to prerogative uses and makes it a quasi prerogative writ. The writs are given to the circuit courts as an appurtenance to their general jurisdiction; to this court, for jurisdiction. Those courts take the writs with unlimited original jurisdiction of them, because they have otherwise general original jurisdiction. Other original jurisdiction is prohibited to this court, and the jurisdiction given by the writs is essentially a limited one. Those courts take the prerogative writs as part of their general jurisdiction, with power to put them to all proper uses. This court takes the prerogative writs for prerogative jurisdiction, with power to put them only to prerogative uses proper." This view of the original jurisdiction of the court was subsequently approved in the Colorado case of Wheeler v. Irrigation Co.1 That court said that "original jurisdiction of the writs mentioned except in cases presenting some special or peculiar exigency, should not be here assumed, save where the interest of the state at large is directly in volved; where its sovereignty is violated, or the liberty of its citizens menaced; where the usurpation or the illegal use of its prerogatives or franchises is the principal and not a collateral question." The court also о Colo. 248.
suggests that in a proper case ' ' a citizen in terested could probably institute the pro ceeding in the name of the people without consulting with the attorney-general." Without entering in detail into the facts and issues in the different cases where the courts of Wisconsin and Colorado assumed or refused to assume original jurisdiction, it is to be observed that the discussion in the various cases as to the nature of the original jurisdiction bestowed by the constitution turns upon the question what matters may come before the court as a court of first resort as distinguished from those matters which may come before it as a court of last resort or as an appellate tribunal. As was said in Attorney-General v. Railroad Com panies this section of the constitution had the effect of making the supreme court a court of first resort with reference to a certain class of judicial questions, to-wit, judicial questions affecting the sovereignty of the state or the liberties of its people. It does not appear to have been conceived that the grant of certain original jurisdiction had the effect of making any matter judicially cognizable which otherwise would not have been, in other words, of enlarging the field of judicial power or the function of the judiciary as one of the three great depart ments of government. Thus in Attorney General v. Railroad Companies the court having decided that the case was one for the exercise of original jurisdiction then proceeds to inquire whether it was one for equitable cognizance. It was assumed that even the supreme court had no jurisdiction unless the case was one within the established bounds of equity jurisdiction. The question being in that case, whether equity had jurisdiction to enjoin the usurpation, excess or abuse of a corporate franchise, it was held that it had. But the case which was particularly urged upon the supreme court of Colorado as supporting its jurisdiction to issue the in junction which it did issue was that of State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Cunning
