RESORT TO THE JUDICIARY Colorado has never attempted to declare that the statutes framed to secure honest elections should be deemed exclusive, and that courts should not exercise jurisdiction in that behalf, except as authorized by the legislature. Conceding arguendo that such a prohibitory statute would be valid if enacted, its non-existence is a controlling factor in favor of the jurisdiction here assailed." ' These high prerogative powers with which the supreme court is clothed are it is said the same prerogative powers which belonged to the King of England before the separate existence of the Court of King's Bench or Chancery and at the time of the Aula Regia where in theory the king always pre sided as the fountain of justice, and ex pounded and enforced the law. Under that theory to the court "belongs authority not only to correct errors in judicial proceedings, but other errors and misdemeanors extra judicial tending to the breach of peace or oppression of the subjects, or to the raising of faction, controversy, debate, or to any manner of misgovernment, so that no wrong or injury, either public or private, can be done, but it shall be (here) reformed or punished by due course of law." 2 Need less to say the Aula Regia was before the days of Montesquieu. So much for the powers claimed for the supreme court of Colorado. The court has not yet handed down an opinion and hence we' do not know to what extent, if at all, the court will accept the views which were presented to it as to its original jurisdiction. Let us however now consider some aspects of the circumstances and effects of the issuance of the writ of injunction and other orders by the court. We find that under circumstances where there was no dispute as to the existence or construction of any law, and where no wrong had actually been committed, public executive and administra-
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tive officers were commanded to do their duty; that the exercise of their discretion was in some respects controlled by the orders of the court; that they were in some instances compelled to act in violation of the duties im posed upon them by statutory enactment; and that they suffered interference and con trol while in the performance of other duties devolved upon them by statute. After acting, while acting and in anticipation of their acting they were at all times under the direct supervision of the court. We find that contrary to generally accepted prin ciples, the process of the court issued to prevent crime pure and simple, although no circumstances involving any of those classes of rights such as ordinarily call for the inter position of a court of equity were present. We find further that the legislature enacted an elaborate system of laws to protect the political liberties of the people, and yet the court assumed to add to such laws or change or defeat them in the exercise of a con current power to protect those same liber ties. It may well be doubted whether a state can invest such powers in a court in so broad a field as is covered by matters touching "the liberties of the people" and yet retain in its essential substance the principle of the separation of the powers of government, for, the protection of "the liberties of the people," it would seem, broadly speaking, covers the whole object and end of a free government. It does not help matters to say as was said to the court that there is a resort simply to a "judicial enforcement " of the laws. Strictly speaking there can be no such thing as a judicial en forcement of any law or the judicial protec tion of constitutional rights and liberties unless these laws or rights and liberties come before the court in the form of a judicial question and arise in a judicial proceeding. Until they do they are not susceptible of the exercise of judicial power at all. What 1 Quoted from the brief of the Attorney-Gen are judicial questions and judicial proceed ings is often a matter of doubt, but the broad eral. 2 Quoted in the brief of the Attorney -General fundamental demarkations of what con from Bagg'scase, n Coke 936.
