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THE GREEN BAG
declaration as the source of their informa tion, Belden and Davis went on to say in their answer that they "believe there is in existence a deed to Mrs. Charles Swayne uncanceled, and that they have MO knowl edge of its repudiation." That must have impressed Judge Swayne as a candid way of treating his own dec laration, mildly informing him that he was not worthy of belief and constituting a new contempt. It indicates perhaps why the answer was not sworn to. Davis did not deny in the answer that he had been of counsel for the plaintiff in the McGuire case, he simply claimed the court had no juris diction over him until he requested the court on the nth to mark his name as at torney for the plaintiff. He testified be fore the Senate that he was not of counsel in that suit, but he did not testify at all before Judge Swayne, and all Judge Swayne had was the evasive denial, not on oath, in the answer. There was testimony on the impeachment trial that Davis was confer_ring with and apparently making sugges tions to Paquet when he was urging a post ponement on Saturday, and at other times, which among other things properly led the judge to believe and hold in the absence of any express denial, as he held in his finding that "his acts in and about the court room had led the court to believe that he was the counsel in the case previous to that time" (Monday). In answer to the question: "Then, Mr. Belden, these facts of what you did outside of that court and as to your notice and the honesty of your purpose in doing them were never brought to the attention of Judge Swayne on the hearing of the proceeding for contempt, were they?" Mr. Belden emphatically said, "Never, under no cir cumstances would I have gone to him." The bringing of the suit in the State Court, the notice in the paper, were all proved. It was hardly necessary to call any one to prove to the judge his own dec laration made to Paquet, and when Belden
and Davis failed to deny that that informa tion had been communicated to them, or that they had any such knowledge, but stood dumb and mute, he clearly had a right to infer, if he was not actually bound to do so, that it had been so communicated to them and that they knew the State suit was without foundation and clearly a con tempt. Who can say that beyond a rea sonable doubt he was wrong in so finding? Who can justify the professional ethics that for the purpose of convicting Judge Swayne of an infamous crime in rendering a judgment, insistently urged upon the Senate facts believed to be important and determining, which were not only not pre sented but were deliberately withheld from him when he rendered that judgment. ' It is to be regretted that the management were confronted with an exigency so great as to make such a course necessary. In this connection it is important to note that after having failed in a writ of prohibi tion to prevent Judge Swayne from pro ceeding against him for the same contempt, Louis Paquet, the leading counsel for plain tiffs in the McGuire case, who drew the precipe in the State Court suit and wrote the newspaper article, and was fully informed of all the facts, came into court March 31, 1902, and filed a signed statement in which he admitted that "through excessive zeal in behalf of his clients he did so act that this honorable court was justified in believ ing the said actions were committed in con tempt thereof, and as showing disrespect therefor" and apologized therefor, where upon he was promptly excused by the judge. This was not in evidence before the court when the judgment was rendered against Belden and Davis, but the confes sion of one of the combination does not tend to impeach that judgment but con firms it. It was urged that Judge Swayne had no jurisdiction of contempt proceedings in such a case. The case was carried before Cir cuit Judge Pardee and with Judges McCor
