THE OPEN MARKET sively. The premise does not justify the conclusion. The individual right is radi cally different from the combined action. The combination has hurtful powers and influences not possessed by the individual. It threatens and impairs rivalry in trade, covets control in prices, seeks and obtains its own advancement at the expense and in the oppression of the public. The differ ence, in legal contemplation, between indi vidual right and combined action in trade, is seen in numerous cases. To protect the individual against encroachments upon his rights by greater power is one of the most sacred duties of courts." The force of the combination in these cases is so overwhelming that it is almost certain that the dealer against whom their efforts are directed will be crushed out. The reality of this oppression carries with it the conviction of the wrongfulness of this dictation by the combination. Even if it were in the face of the logic of the law, most men would call this competition unfair. For most men wish to see the perpetuation of the open market; and if a combination may work its will in this way, the end of industrial liberty is indeed at hand. The result of all this is that a combination •which forces a rival out of business by con certed refusal to have any dealings with those who continue relations with their rivals, is put to its justification, so that it must show by what warrant in public policy it should be allowed to take such measures to strike at a rival, even in the course of competition. V To be quite accurate, it must be admitted that there is conflict of authority upon these matters. There are courts which hold that a combination can use its force to drive the customers of a rival away; and these should be given a hearing if this investigation is to be conducted impartially. One of the strongest of these cases is Macauley Bros. v. Tierney, 19 R. I. 255. The complainants •were master plumbers, engaged in business
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in Providence. The respondents were of ficers of the Providence Master Plumbers' Association, a body affiliated with a National Association. This general association had adopted resolutions that they would with draw their patronage from any firm manu facturing or dealing in plumbing material which sold to others than members of the affiliated associations. The enforcement of this resolution by the officers was so strict that complainants were almost driven out of business after they had refused to join the local association and be bound by its rules. Chief Justice Matteson refused to grant an injunction. He said in part: "The cause and excuse for the sending of the notices, it is evident, was a selfish desire on the part of the members of the association to rid themselves of the competition of those not members, with a view to increasing the profits of their own business. The ques tion, then, resolves itself into this: Was the desire to free themselves from competition a sufficient excuse in legal contemplation for the sending of the notices? We think the question must receive an affirmative answer. Competition, it has been said, is the life of trade. Every act done by a trader for the purpose of diverting trade from a rival and attracting it to himself is an act intention ally done and, in so far as it is successful, to the injury of the rival in his business, since to that extent it lessens his gains and profits. To hold sxich an act wrongful and illegal would be to stifle competition. Trade should be free and unrestricted; and hence every trader is left to his business in his own way, and cannot be held accountable to a rival who suffers a loss of profits by anything he may do, so long as the meth ods he employs are not of the class of which fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation, co ercion, obstruction, or molestation of the rival or his servants or workmen, and the procurement of violation of contractual re lations, are instances." A more recent case with more complica
