THE OPEN MARKET refused to perform the necessary services and furnish the necessary articles for the burial of plaintiff's wife. This refusal was made because of this claim of C. Miller's Sons that Brewster was indebted to them for previous services, as stated. It was al leged in the suit which was brought for this refusal that the Funeral Directors' Associa tion was a confederation, and by reason of the terms and purposes of the combination the defendants refused to furnish any of the materials or render services necessary for the burial of the plaintiff's wife, and that the defendants refused for the purpose of enforcing by duress and oppression the col lection of the debt due C. Miller's Sons. The court — Mr. Justice Paynter wrote the opinion — could find nothing wrong in this; they say: "A party may engage in the grocery business, selling necessaries of life, and a hungry, starving man might call at his place of business and seek to buy such articles of food as he needs, and whilst we would say it was inhuman for the grocerman to refuse to sell him, yet it could not be said that his refusal was unlawful, and that a cause of action could be maintained against him for such refusal. When one desires to bury his dead, it may be an unfeeling act for an undertaker to refuse to furnish neces sary material and necessary services to ac complish it, still his refusal to do so does not impose any legal liability upon him. Undertakers are approached by those in great bereavement who desire their services to inter the dead. Under such circum stances they do not feel disposed to demand in advance compensation. Regard for the feelings of those so bereaved forbids that they do so. However, if one has on a pre vious occasion received the services of the undertaker, and his material, and has re fused or failed to pay the bill, it is certainly not unreasonable to refuse to permit him to increase his indebtedness or to render him services. To afford mutual protection against such persons it is not unlawful for the undertakers of the community to asso
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ciate themselves together and agree to re fuse to render a like service to one who has refused or failed to pay such expen ses in the past to some member of the associ ation." What one really wants to know as to these last two cases is whether the question is essentially different from the cases dis cussed before these were brought up. Is there any essential difference in fact? Is not the interference equally plain? Is not the oppression of the combination as great? Are not competitive conditions disturbed just as much? It seems that an affirmative answer must be returned to all of these questions; and if so the exertion of such pressure by such combinations seems to be opposed to the same public policy which would protect the individual as before. VIII A formidable case of this class where the members of the association do not go out side of their own organization in conducting their operations is Barr v. the Essex Trades Council, S3 N. J. Eq. 101 (1894). The Trades Council was made up by the affilia tion of eighteen trades unions for the pur pose of using the great purchasing power of their combined membership to their ad vantage. The plan of. operation was to re fuse to deal with any but dealers who handled " fair " goods exclusively made under union condition. Publicity was given the movement by a publication called " The Union Buyer," the first announcement of which was as follows: "Our mission — To support the supporters and boycott the boycotters of organized fair labor. To promote the public welfare by the diffusion of common cents, urging all to carry these in trade only to those who will return them to the people in the shape of living wages." Barr, the plaintiff, got into a controversy with his employees, and the Trades Council took up their cause, calling on its members not to have anything to do with his newspaper.
