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THE APPLICABILITY OF ENGLISH METHODS The practice described in Mr. Crane's article under sub-heading: "Summary Judg ment" points attention to one of the worst effects of a congested trial docket, and would do much to alleviate its hardships. Persons without a just defense will inter pose formal defenses in order that they may obtain delay, expecting to force a more favorable settlement before the case is reached for trial, feeling sure they will be no worse off if they fail. This is a result of the congestion of business, not a cause of it, for such cases are disposed of in some way before trial, without taking up the time of the court. The congestion is due to cases really litigated. In Ohio, and I presume in other states, the right to file a general denial lies at the root of this evil. Abolish the general denial and adopt order xiv of the English Rules of Procedure, and sham defenses to secure delay would be greatly diminished, if not wholly abolished. This rule is the only one referred to in Mr. Crane's article which, it seems to me, would greatly help in solving our troubles. In a large local unit of government, like the county, of which I have been speaking, the difficulty of getting cases heard and tried are very much greater than in smaller and less populous districts. The working hours in court must, of necessity, be shorter; for lawyers and judges live longer distances, at least in time, from the court house. The number of cases tried by judges seems to decrease in proportion to the number of judges who have control of the business. The methods of handling and getting tried cases which are ready for hearing is found the potent cause of a congested docket. The conditions in this county I doubt not, is typical of all large and grow ing' cities that have tried to manage busi ness by methods developed under simpler conditions. Previous to 1901, the system of assigning cases by each individual judge was in. operation. Under it blocks of cases were set off to each judge, and from five

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to ten cases were set for each day, for a week in advance. At the opening of the court cases were called, beginning at the head of the assignment, and the call con tinued until a case was put on trial. Those which were not ready went to the foot of the list, were continued, or reset for another day. If a case on trial was carried into the next day's assignment, the cases for that day were also obliged to be called and reset, or continued. The same order pre vailed in each of the several rooms, in which judges were trying cases. The result was that no one knew to a certainty when his case would be reached; and it was difficult for counsel to arrange conflicting engage ments, or to procure the attendance of witnesses. As the trial work is done by a small percentage of the members of the bar, the loss of time was enormous, and the despatch of business seemingly impossible. Oftentimes judges and juries would be out of work, notwithstanding the large number of cases fixed for that day. These condi tions are the inevitable incident of a number of judges having control of a specific num ber of cases, and of setting a large batch for a day certain. The evils are beyond the reach of rules of procedure. To remedy this condition a system was devised which has worked admirably, and promises to become a solution of the prob lem. The duty of assigning cases for trial is taken from the judges, and placed under the control of the assignment clerk. He performs the functions of a train despatcher, as it were, for the business of the courts; he keeps a case always ready for each judge and jury, and sends it to the first vacant room. After a case is sent to a room, it must be tried, or dismissed, or continued, only on a showing of good cause. Con tinuances are quite rare after a case goes to a room. A case is not sent to a room while any of the counsel in it are engaged in another court, but is held without losing its position, until counsel are disengaged. Engagements of counsel, or absence of wit