NOTES OF RECENT CASES OF IMPORTANCE FROM THE NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM (Copies of the pamphlet Reporters containing full reports of any of these decisions may be secured from the West Pub lishing Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, at 15 cents each. In ordering, the title of the desired case should be given as well as the citation of volume and page of the Reporter in which it is printed.)
BREACH OF CONTRACT.
(DAMAGES — RE-
MOTEN'BSS)
SUPREME COURT OP NEW YORK, APP. Div., 2 DKPT. A decision which, while grounded on a prin ciple as old as the law of damages and indeed an indispensable part of that law, is interesting because of the peculiar nature of one of the grounds of damage alleged in the case, is that of Jenks, J., in Coppola v. Kraushaar, 42 New York Supplement, 436. Plaintiff complained that on January 3, 1902. he ordered of the defendant two gowns for his betrothed, to be made after a certain model; that the defendant was told at the time that plaintiff was to wed on January 19, and was incurring great expense for the wedding feast; that defendant agreed, in consideration of fifty dollars, of which he then received from the plaintiff ten dollars, to furnish the gowns to the •woman on or before January 18; that on January i S the plaintiff and his betrothed demanded the gowns, but that the defendant wholly failed in performance; that in consequence of such failure, the wedding appointed for January 19 "was broken off' by the lady, and the expenses "which the plaintiff went to in buying presents, wines clothes, and other expenses," to the extent of five hundred dollars, were "expended uselessly," wherefore he demanded damages in the sum stated. The decision of the question presented is brief, and cannot be more accurately or con cisely stated than by quoting from the opinion: "The suit is novel in view of the damages laid — so novel, that one is almost tempted to conjec ture that the pleader has lost sight of the dis tinction between breach of contract and breach of promise of marriage. It cannot be said that the damages alleged were the immediate and necessary result of the breach, or to have entered into the contemplation of the parties when they made the contract. Although the plaintiff im pressed upon the defendant the necessity of per formance by January 18, by stating the occasion of the need, he did not foretell the consequences now alleged. He does not allege that either of the 'two dresses' was the bridal gown. On the other hand, there is nothing alleged to show or permit the inference that the defendant could or should contemplate that his default would result in even a postponement of the wedding feast, much less that the wedding would 'be broken' whatever that term may import; and it must im port more than a mere postponement, inasmuch as
it is alleged that the expenses for presents, wines, and clothes were useless, while presents, wines, and clothes, bought in view of a wedding, are only useless when the wedding is not only postponed, but does not come to pass. Before the defendant can be held to these alleged damages for them. I think that the parties must have had in con templation that the wedding would never occur if the defendant failed to furnish the two dresses on the day before the appointed time. While such a disappointment would naturally be keen to any prospective bride, it is hardly to be con templated, in the absence of specific warning, that she would forever refuse to wed, if those 'two dresses' were not forthcoming before the day set for the ceremony. The damages are too remote. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341; Rochester Lantern Co v. Stiles & Parker Press Co. 135 N. Y. 209. 31 N. E. 1018; Dodds v. Hakes, 114 N. Y. 261, 2i N. E. 398; Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489, 69 Am. Dec. 718." CIVIL RIGHTS. ("PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOM MODATIONS ' ' — BOOT-BLACKING STAND) COURT OP APPEALS OF NEW YORK. The decision of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 4th Dept., in Burks v. Bosso, 8 1 New York Supplement 384, which was that a boot-blacking stand in the corridor of a public building is a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of New York Laws 1895, c. 1042, § i, providing that all persons shall be entitled to equal accommodation and privileges of hotels, theaters and other places of public ac commodation, is reversed. The Supreme Court decision was noted in a former number of this magazine, so that but brief reference to the facts need be made. The statute referred to provides a penalty for its violation, and plaintiff brought action for the penalty, alleging that he was refused accommodation at defendant's boot-blacking stand on account of his color. The Court of Appeals in a brief and unanimous opinion holds that in view of the well-settled rule that purely statutory offenses cannot be established by implication and that acts in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal, unless there is a clear and unequivocal intention of the leg islature to make them such, the statute cannot be construed as including a boot-blacking estab lishment. The phrase "other places of public
