THE MAINTENANCE OF THE OPEN SHOP was in law malicious and unquestionably wrongful. The appellant was a man of family, a good workman, engaged in a law ful pursuit, performing his duties in an entirely satisfactory manner, without ob jection in any respect, and willing and desirous of becoming a member of the appellee if an opportunity had been afforded him. He was not able to obtain member ship with the appellee, nor was he permitted to continue his work with his employers, who would gladly have retained him in their service, if they could have done so without loss or embarrassment to themselves. Can it then be seriously questioned, that from the evidence in this cause the appellee in tended or expected any other or different result from the sending of the written notice than that which followed its reception by Rosenfeld Brothers? The testimony in this cause assigns no other motive, and there is not the slightest intimation from any source that there is any. If, therefore, the appellee sought to bring about the dis charge of the appellant under the circum stances detailed in the evidence, if not malicious it was certainly wrongful, and by so doing it has invaded the legal rights of the appellant for which an action properly lies." The most recent case in point is even more thoroughgoing in its denunciation of these attempts by the unions to force non-union men out of the same employment. In Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, there appeared in evidence a series of labor difficulties in the eonstruction of a building too involved to re late here. Finally the central union showed its hand and threatened a general strike un less "certain men engaged on the work who were not members of an affiliated union should be immediately laid off. An applica tion was made in time for an injunction which the lower court granted and the upper court confirmed. Mr. Justice Dean held upon this case: "Trades unions may cease to work for rea sons satisfactory to their members; but if
they combine to prevent others from ob taining work by threats of a strike, or com bine to prevent an employer from employ ing others by threats of a strike, they com bine to accomplish an unlawful purpose — a purpose as unlawful now as it ever was, though not punishable by indictment. Such combination is a despotic and tyrannical violation of the indefeasible right of labor to acquire property, which courts are bound to restrain. It is argued that defendants, either individually or by organization, have the right now to peaceably persuade plain tiffs and others not to work, and their em ployer not to hire them. So they have. It is further argued that they can quit work when they choose. So they can. But neither of these suggested cases is the one before us. Here a strike on a large building was declared because plaintiffs would not join a particular society. The declared pur pose of the strike was to cause loss of em ployment to plaintiffs because they would not join the Allied Building Trades, and chose to remain faithful to their own union, The Plumber's League." The cases brought up for discussion in this section are undoubtedly less extreme than the cases under consideration in the preceding section. It may be admitted that in the case of unionizing, the ultimate motive of the union is to advance its own interests; but so it is in boycotting. In boy cotting the end was held not to justify the means, and this may well enough be true of unionizing. The principal question is, then, whether this sort of concerted action is to be held justifiable or not. In this respect a difference may be urged between boycotting and unionizing; it may be said that in boy cotting the methods employed are indirect, and much unnecessary damage is therefore done to third parties; while in unionizing it may be claimed that the methods are direct and that there is no unnecessary damage. But the fact remains that both in the case of boycotting and in the case of unionizing, we see the resistless force of numbers em
