THE NORTH SEA INQUIRY mental, of attending to the possible needs of the fishermen, provided he had sufficient grounds for his belief as to the danger to which his fleet was exposed. The answer to this question naturally depends, there fore, chiefly upon the principal issue of the controversy, namely, WAS ADMIRAL RojDESTVENSKY'S CONDUCT IN OPENING FIRE REASONABLY JUSTIFIED BY THE CIRCUM STANCES? This is the kernel of the entire matter. Attention is called, in this connection, to the fifth paragraph of the Russian Case, showing that on the afternoon of October aist. the "Kamchatka," one of the vessels of the Russian fleet, was obliged, by reason of a damaged engine, to fall behind the rest and was proceeding 17 miles in the rear of the flag-ship; and to the second paragraph of the British Case, stating that, between 8 and 9 o'clock, p. M., on that day, the Kamchatka fired on the Swedish mer chantman, Aldcbaran; also to the first and third sections of the Russian Case, as show ing the nervousness in the minds of the Russian officers. These allegations were sub stantiated by the evidence; and the action of the Kamchatka in firing on the Aldebaran, as well as other similar instances reported, show that there was, on the part of Admiral Rojdestvensky and his officers, grave appre hension of danger. As to this condition of mind, the follow ing correspondence by wireless telegraphy was testified to by Lieutenant Valrond, the official telegraphist of the Kamchatka. At •8.40 o'clock, about the time that the firing at the Aldebaran began, he sent the follow ing message to the Russian Admiral : "We are pursued by torpedo-boats," to which Admiral Rojdestvensky replied : "Is it you that are being attacked? How many torpedo-boats are there and in •what quarter?" Valrond — "I am steaming with all lights out. Am attacked from all sides. The tor pedo-boats are less than two cable-lengths from us."
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Admiral — "What is your course?" Valrond — "We take different courses in order to get away from the torpedo-boats. For the last quarter of an hour our course has been south, 10 degrees, speed 12 knots." Valrond (later) — "Indicate position of Squadron." Admiral — "First get out of danger. Change your course to the west. Then give your latitude and longitude and you will be told what to do." The last telegram was sent about 10 P.M., at which time the Kamchatka had ceased firing. Admiral Rojdestvensky estimated, from the information given him, that the torpedoboats reported to be in the rear of his squadron might reach him shortly after midnight. The soundness of this conclu sion was not questioned by the board of naval experts constituting the Commission.1 Therefore Admiral Rojdestvensky and his subalterns were expecting an attack about the time they encountered the fishing fleet. The North Sea is not a part of the ter ritorial waters of any state. No rule of International Law forbade its use as a fighting place by the belligerents. In the absence of any treaty fixing other limits, the territorial waters of a nation must still be regarded as extending only three miles from shore, with certain exceptions, none of which include the district of Dogger Bank. Even within this three-mile limit the right to pro hibit hostilities may be regarded as doubt ful. A friendly Power is reported to have warned Russia that the fleet was in danger of an attack in passing through the North Sea. Such warnings had come to Russia repeatedly and had been communicated to Admiral Rojdestvensky. Reports had also reached him of the actual presence of tor pedo-boats in the neighborhood. He had had no opportunity to verify these reports, but had left Skagen twenty-four hours in advance of his schedule and had deployed 1 See Paragraph 7 of the Report.
