THE GREEN BAG "The principles quoted above recognize the legal right of members of an organization to strike, that is, to cease working in a body by prearrangement until a grievance is re dressed, and they enumerate some things that may be treated as the subject of a grievance, namely, the desire to obtain higher wages, shorter hours of labor or im proved relations with their employers, but this enumeration does not, I take it, purport to cover all the grounds which will lawfully justify members of an organization refusing in a body and by pre-arrangement, to work. The enumeration is illustrative rather than comprehensive, for the object of such an organization is to benefit all its members and it is their right to strike, if need be, in order to secure any lawful benefit to the several members of the organization as, for instance, to secure the re-employment of a member they regard as having been improp erly discharged, and to secure from an em ployer of a member of them, employment for other members of their organization who may be out of employment, although the effect will be to cause the discharge of other employees who are not members." Three of the seven judges dissented from this. It may well be doubted how far this case is authority. It really is a decision upon a special case; that of skilled artisans who re fuse to work except with those who have passed their qualifying examinations; this may well enough be an exception. That it is fair to distinguish the case thus is shown by the fact that the majority do not purport to overrule Curran v. Galen which, as may be seen from the abstract given in a pre ceding section, is square affirmation of the right of non-union men in general to pro tection from the unions. At least it may be claimed, therefore, that New. York cannot be counted for either side in estimating the authority. A case that plainly holds for the union is Clemmett v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38. In this case, again, a body of employees in a coal mine demanded the discharge of a cer
tain man. The owners refusing, a strike was called; whereupon the employers yielded and the man was discharged. Again, the suit brought by the man forced out was to recover damages caused by the conspiracy. The gist of Mr Justice Garvin's opinion was this: "There is no law to compel one man or any body of men to work for or with another who is personally obnoxious to them. We cannot believe it to be in ac cordance with the spirit of our institutions 1 or the law of the land to say that a body of workmen must respond in damages because they, without malice or any evil motive, peaceably and quietly quit work which they are not required to continue, rather than remain at work with one who is for any reason unsatisfactory to them." Whatever weight may be given to these two decisions as authority, they represent the view of the minority; the contrary hold ing undoubtedly has the majority.1 It is, therefore, the general American law that 1 The position taken in this article that the non-union man is protected against the union is the law of the following jurisdictions at least — MAINE: Perkins v. Pendleton, QO Me. 166 (1897); MARYLAND: Lucke v. Clothing Cutters Assembly, 77 Md. 396 (1893); MASSACHUSETTS: Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (1900): PENNSYLVANIA: Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79 (1903). In the following jurisdictions the issue is in doubt — ENGLAND: Allen v. Food (1898) A. C. i and Perrault v. Gauthier, 28 Can. Sup. 241 (1899), are for the union, but Quinn v. Leatham (1901) A. C. 495 and Giblan v. National Amalgamated Union (1903) 2 K. B. 600 are distinctly for the non union man; NEW YORK: Curran v. Gallen, 152 N. Y. 33 (1897) and Davis Machine Company v. Robinson, 41 Misc. 329 (1903) are for the non union man, but National Protective Association v. Cummings, 170 N. Y. 315 (1902) and Davis v. United Hoisting Engineers, 28 App. Div. 396 hold for the union. In two jurisdictions at least the law permits the union to force the non-union man out — NEW JERSEY: Meyer v. Journeymen Stonecutters' Association, 47 N. J. Eq. 519 (1890) which, however is based upon the court's inter pretation of the local trades union statutes; INDIANA: Clemmit v. Watson, 14 Ind. App. 38 (1895), in which again the court relies upon the repeal of the former conspiracy statutes.
