THE LIGHTER SIDE recognize as a valid cause of action a claim in respect of debts of the company arising by virtue of the law of a foreign country which was inconsistent with the limitations of the shareholders' liability according to English law, and that any proceeding by the company to enlarge the liability of a shareholder beyond that fixed by the constitution or charter of the company must be held by an English Court to be ultra vires. He carefully consid ered Flash v. Conn (109 U. S. 371), and Pinney v. Nelson (183 U. S. 144), which were cited and relied upon by the plaintiffs. In both of these cases a shareholder of a foreign corpora tion had been held to be charged with the liability imposed by the California Code, but in the opinion of the learned judge they could be distinguished from the present case. In the former case the defendant was a share holder in a company incorporated under an Act of the New York Legislature which ex
pressly provided for the liability of individual stockholders in such a corporation in respect of the debts of the corporate body; and in the latter case it did not appear from Mr. Justice Brewer's judgment or the report of the case what were the provisions, if any, in the articles of incorporation (the defendant being a Colorado company) as to the limita tions of liability. All that could be plainly inferred being that neither under their pro visions nor under the law of Colorado was there anything expressly declaring the per sonal liability of stockholders for debts of the corporation. There was the further dis tinction, in the judge's opinion, that Pinney v. Nelson was an action brought in California against stockholders in the corporation who were residents in and citizens of that state, and therefore properly within the jurisdiction of the local courts. STUFF GOWN.
THE LIGHTER SIDE A LAWYER, now deceased, but formerly one of the best known in western Iowa, and for some time member of the Board of Bar Ex aminers for his state, and the youngest man said to have ever been admitted to practice in Iowa, related his experience in one of his first cases to a number of students before the Examining Board not long since. He said, "It was one of my first cases and being for the plaintiff of course had the open ing and closing argument to the jury. And being somewhat noted and conceited too, as to my oratorical abilities, sought with all the command of language, powers of Delsarte, and gestures I had at hand, to make an impres sion on the minds of the jury. "Opposed to me, on the side of the de fense, was an old Kentucky lawyer, who, not being able to withstand the strenuous times of that commonwealth, just preceding the Civil War, had removed to this state to prac tise law. "When the old man arose to make his argument to the jury he said, 'Gentlemen of the jury, first let me answer the young man's argument.' "He then went over all the motions and
gestures I had made without uttering one word. 'There,' he said, 'is all there is to the young man's argument.' 'Now,' he says, 'the young man reminds me of an old mule I used to have on the farm down in Kentucky. Regularly every Sunday morning I used to turn the old mule out to graze, and as soon as he was turned out he would begin to kick. Every time he would kick, he would bray, and every time he would bray, he would kick, and I used to lean on the old rail fence watch ing that mule, wondering whether he was braying at the kick or whether he was kick ing at the bray.' "And the old man closed his argument by saying, ' Now, gentlemen of the jury, I would like for the young man to answer this ques tion: Is he braying at the kick or is he kick ing at the bray? ' "Of course I had felt the effects of the old man's argument, and in closing refrained from any attempt at oratorical display. 'Gentle men,' I says, 'I am now done,' and sat down. Jumping hastily to my feet, I says, 'Just one moment, gentlemen, there is one point I overlooked. The old man wished to know whether I was braying at the kick or whether
