NOTES OF RECENT CASES GAME LAWS. (SALES OUT OP SEASON — WILD DEER — EVIDENCE) GEORGIA SUPREME COURT. In Crosby v. State, 48 Southeastern Reporter, 913, it is held that under the Georgia Game Law of 1896, prohibiting the sale of wild deer during the prohibited season, it is necessary for the prose cution to introduce affirmative evidence that deer, which it was alleged were sold in violation of the statute, were wild, and hence mere proof that deer meat was sold was insufficient to make out a prima jade case. This holding seems to proceed very largely from the rule requiring criminal laws to be construed strictly, it being pointed out that the act in ques tion, though making it an offense to offer for sale any gamebird or animal, does not make the mere possession of deer meat an offense, which it might Ъе competent for the legislature to do if such had been its intention. INDIRECT DAMAGES. (NEGLIGENCE OF CAR RIER — PROXIMATE CAUSE) KANSAS CITY COURT OF APPEALS. A curious illustration of indirect damage re sulting from the negligence of a carrier is contained in Estes v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 85 South western Reporter, 627. Plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's trains which became dis abled between stations and which, while in this condition, was run into by another train, injuring a number of passengers. Some one stated in plaintiff's hearing that another train was approach ing from the rear and that there was about to be another collision, whereupon plaintiff, although the car she was in had not been injured, left it, and went and sat down in the shade by the side of the track, where she was poisoned by poison ivy. She was held entitled to recover for the injuries result ing from the poisoning, the court holding that while the car in which she had been a passenger was fit for occupancy, she was nevertheless justi fied, under the circumstances, in leaving it, and impliedly holding that the negligence of the rail road company with respect to the collision was the proximate cause of the injuries resulting from the poisoning. The court admits its inability to find any authority directly in point, but states that if there is none, the principle is sound, and that the present case will afford the precedent. INJUNCTION. (INDUCING VIOLATION OF CON TRACT) U. S. CIRCUIT COURT, DIST. OF MASS. The case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Goldthwaite, 133 Federal Reporter, 794, involves in its essential issue the same question as that de
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cided in the two trading-stamp cases noted in the last issue of this magazine, to-wit: the rights which a vendor of personalty may acquire as against a remote vendee by virtue of the terms of a contract with the immediate vendee. The Medical Company manufactured proprie tary medicines put up in distinctive packages and sold only through wholesale and retail dealers in drugs, with whom the company had contracts providing that the medicines should be sold only at certain uniform prices and to no other dealers than such as became parties to the contract. A list of such persons was furnished by the Medical Company to each dealer. A retail dealer who had no contract with the medical company procured the medicines through another who, in selling them, violated his contract. The purchaser then muti lated the packages so as to prevent identification, and in some cases emptied the original package into a plain package and also sold the medicines at prices below those fixed by the contract be tween the Medical Company and its regular patrons. The Medical Company was held entitled to an injunction restraining the dealer from interfering with the contracts by inducing their violation by parties thereto, and also from selling the medicines as complainant's in other than the original pack ages and at the contract price. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. (EXCESSIVE CHARGES — RECOVERY IN STATE COURT) TEXAS COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS. The question of the extent to which state courts may regulate the rates charged by interstate com merce is considered at some length in Abilene Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 85 Southwestern Reporter, 1052. Texas Rev. St. 1895, art. 3258, declares that the common law is in force, save as altered or repealed by statute. In terstate Commerce Act. sec. 1,2, declares that all charges by carriers shall be reasonable and makes unreasonable charges unlawful. By section 8 any one injured by a violation of the Act is given the right to damages, and section 9 gives jurisdiction to the Federal courts, of actions brought under section 8. Section 22 provides that nothing in the statute shall in any way abridge remedies existing at common law, but that the provisions of the statute are in addition thereto. The Oil Company brought an action in the state court to recover for unreasonable freight charges exacted by the railroad, and the lower court, al though finding that the charges were unreason able, concluded as a matter of law, that as the rate charged had been duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and published and posted
