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EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT

491

CURRENT LEGAL ARTICLES This department represents a selection of the most important leading articles in all the English and American Ifgal periodicals of the preceding month. The space devoted to a summary does not always represent ike relative importance of the article, for essays of the most permanent value are usually so condensed in style that further abbre viation is impracticable.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Delegation of Legisla tive Power)

IN the Central Law Journal of July 7 (V. Ixi, p. 3) F. E. Williams prints a brief en titled, "In How Far May Acts of the Legis lature be Made Contingent upon Being Ac cepted by Popular Vote without Violating the Principle that Legislative Power Cannot be Delegated." He summarizes his views as follows: "It may be said under the sanction of what is believed to be the better opinion and weight of authority, that the following propo sitions are established: "First. Independent of any express consti tutional authorization, the enactment, opera tion, or taking effect of a legislative act cannot be made contingent upon popular acceptance by the state at large, for the reason that such acceptance is inconsistent with our system of representative government and is therefore construed as a violation of the principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. "Second. In the absence of an express con stitutional limitation, local option laws both general and special, if confined to local affairs, may be passed, although their operation is contingent upon a favorable vote of the dis tricts to be affected, and such laws do not violate the principle that legislative power cannot be delegated, for the reason that they are justified by virtue of the power and dis cretion of the legislature in its control of public corporations, and because of their an alogy to the system of local self-government which existed in America before our constitu tions were adopted and in the mother country from time immemorial." CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Freedom of Contract. Limitation of Hours of Labor)

JEROME C. KNOWLTON contributes to the June Michigan Law Review (V. iii, p. 617) an article on the constitutional right of "Free

of Contract." Of contracts with muni cipalities he says: "There can be no doubt but that the state, for itself or its municipalities, mere agents of the state for most purposes, may by general law specify the terms upon which it will con tract with parties. There is no principle of local self-government involved." The cases, however, leave this principle of doubtful ap plication. "The line of demarkation in this respect between the legislative functions and the business functions of a municipality is very dim and sometimes overlooked. Free dom of contract is, by some courts, consider ably restricted, as in the Atkin case, and wholly unbridled, as in the Michigan case. The New York doctrine, if we can tell what it is, seems to approach nearer to the constitu tional guarantees of the citizen. "The right of contract as between indi viduals is no less uncertain than as between the individual and the state. It is conceded that this right as pertaining to private prop erty or personal liberty is guaranteed by the Constitution of the state and of the nation, but what limitations may be placed upon its free enjoyment present troublesome questions before the courts. ' ' Where persons are incapacitated from giv ing complete assent to a contract, by reason of age or infirmity or artificiality of construc tion or where the contract itself is of such a nature that the making of it would be detri mental to the public generally, then there is little doubt of the right and duty of the legis lature to regulate or prohibit. Within this field public policy has full control, but beyond it the Constitution stands to protect the citi zen in his natural rights. "The right of contract is possessed and en joyed subject to the police power of the state. This power has never been defined, and its relation to freedom of contract is imperfectly understood. It certainly includes the power