EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT impossible of attainment, that is, where there is a want of power to enforce it, if granted, it will be withheld. The Governor being the chief executive officer of the state, is not amenable to the processes attempted to be enforced by executive officers of a rank in ferior to him. No power exists to compel the chief executive to act." EVIDENCE (Expert Testimony)
IN the June Michigan Law Review (V. iii, p. 597) H. B. Hutchins continues his treatise on "The Examination of the Medical Expert." He concludes his elaborate analysis of the cases as follows: "A reading of the cases upon the subject of expert testimony must reveal the fact that the criticisms of the courts upon it are justi fied, not on account of any inherent danger in such testimony, or because of its necessarily unsatisfactory character, but rather because of the frequent failure of counsel to conduct the examination of experts in accordance with the rules governing the admission of opinion evidence and a lack of appreciation, or, at all events, a forgetfulness, in many cases, by both counsel and expert that the function of the latter is quasi-judicial. In his enthusiasm for his client, the trial lawyer steps beyond the bounds, and he finds a ready second in his expert who has become imbued with the spirit of the advocate. The result is error which prompts caustic comments by the re viewing court, not always upon the course of counsel or the attitude of the witness, but frequently upon the general worthlessness and danger of expert testimony. That within his proper field the expert is a necessary factor in the administration of justice, cannot admit of doubt. In many cases, without his aid, courts and juries would be helpless. That expert testimony, if the case demands it, and it is properly and logically developed, is safe and. helpful, is the verdict of reason and experience. In the absence of a reform that would make the expert the appointed officer of the court, instead of the paid employee of a party, he can escape disparagement only through the care of counsel in the conducting of the examination and his own care in preserving the judicial attitude."
493
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Destruction of Neutral Prize) A BRIEF sketch of the law relating to "Destruction of Neutral Ships by a Bellige rent" by Hugh H. L. Bellot, in the Law Times of July i (V. cxix, p. 193) thus summarizes the subject: "By a universal rule of international law a belligerent captor must take his prize, whether enemy or neutral, into one of his own ports for adjudication. To this rule there are certain exceptions, some of which are generally rec ognized as legitimate, whilst others are re garded as doubtful, or, at any rate, do not receive universal acceptance. The recent cases of the Thea, the Knight Commander, and the Oldhamia are examples of the latter class. To the general rule, the destruction of an enemy's ships forms the first exception. The weight of authority, municipal regulations, and inter national usage unite in admitting that under certain circumstances, such as the dangerous condition of the prize, the possibility (if re leased) of giving information to the enemy, the want of men to form a prize crew, the lack of provisions or water, the prize, if an enemy's, may be ransomed, sold, retained, and used as a tender or what not or destroyed. "The proposition that a belligerent may destroy every ship, perhaps chartered by a neutral and laden with neutral goods, sailing under his enemy's flag, because he lacks a prize crew or has no ports, is not supported either by international usage, law, or author ity. 'Such a proposition,' says Mr. Charles Clarke, 'is an application of the rule of piracy which may be very convenient to the pirate, .but is wholly unjustifiable as to anyone else.1 ' ' But with the destruction of neutral vessels and cargoes it is far otherwise. A right to destroy neutral vessels has no existence in international law. If it is impossible to bring a neutral prize within the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction, she must be released immediately. "The confusion of thought which has made this an apparent exception to the general rule that a prize, whether enemy or neutral, must be brought in for adjudication has arisen from regarding exceptional conduct as a rule of conduct. "What the decisions of the English prize
