NOTES OF RECENT CASES Rep. 719; Chin Bak Kan r. U. S. 186 U. S. 193. 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891; Fok Young Yo v. U. S. 185 U. S. 296, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686, and Lem Moon Sing v. U. S. 158 U. S. 538, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967. The court then holds that the constitutional guar anty of due process of law does not require a judicial trial, and is not infringed by the Chinese immigration act making the decision of the appro priate department on the right of a person of Chinese descent to enter conclusive on the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings in the absence of any abuse of authority, even where citizenship is the ground on which the right of entry is claimed, citing in addition to the above, Nishimura Ekiu v. U. S. 142 U. S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336 and Fong Yue Ting v. U. S. 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016. Judge Brewer in his dissenting opinion says that the decision is to his mind appalling, and that, if the procedure provided for by the rules of the Department of Commerce and Labor does not constitute a star chamber proceeding of the most stringent sort, what more is necessary to make it one? adding, "I do not see how any one can read these rules and hold that they constitute due process of law for the arrest and deporta tion of a citizen of the United States." CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (EQUAL PROTEC TION OP THE LAWS — DUE PROCESS OP LAW — PROSECUTION- OF LYNCHERS) U. S. C. C., N. D. ALA.
Ex parte Riggins, 134 Federal Reporter, 404, was a habeas corpus proceeding growing out of the lynching of a negro named Maples at Huntsville, Ala. The federal grand jury indicted a number of the lynching party for conspiracy under sections 5508 and 5509 of the Revised Statutes. The in dictment alleged that, by reason of the acts com plained of, Maples was deprived of the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities secured to him by the constitution and laws of the United States. The demurrers to the indictment were overruled by Judge Jones in an interesting and exhaustive opinion, the principal holdings of which are to the effect that it is impossible for private persons to prevent the enjoyment of the right to the equal protection of the laws under the four teenth amendment, since that right is actually enjoyed when a citizen is not improperly dis criminated against in the making or execution of state laws. The due process of law guaranteed by the same amendment, however, is denied when individuals forcibly take a prisoner from the custody of state authorities and lynch him, making it impossible for the state to afford him the enjoy ment of the proceedings which make up the state's established course of judicial procedure. Also,
503
that the authority given to Congress to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment in cludes and involves the power to legislate for the protection which the amendment creates, and that this power may be exercised by Congress either under the implied power found in the amendment itself, or under it and section 8 of article i of the constitution, giving Congress general authority to enforce all powers vested in it by the Constitution. DIVORCE. (DIVISION OF PROPERTY — RIGHT OP ACTION POR PERSONAL INJURIES) COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OP TEXAS. In Ligon v. Ligon, 87 Southwestern Reporter, 838, an effort was made to set aside a judgment granting a divorce, and providing further that a right of action which the defendant below had against a certain railroad company for personal injuries sustained while in the service of the rail road company, was community property, and setting apart an undivided half interest in this cause of action to the wife in her own right. Pro vision was also made for the payment of a certain sum for the support of a child. The injury above referred to was received by the defendant below after he and his wife had agreed to a separation, and after the suit for the divorce in question had been instituted. The court disposes of the question as to whether this right of action is community property by the simple statement that there was no error below. No cases are cited. EMINENT DOMAIN. (REMOVAL OF PROCEED ING TO FEDERAL COURT) U. S. SUPREME COURT. The United States Supreme Court holds that a proceeding for the taking of land by eminent domain, authorized by the statutes of a state to be begun in courts of that state, is, where the requisite diversity of citizenship exists, a suit involving a controversy between citizens of different states, of which a federal circuit court has original jurisdiction, and which is, therefore, removable to that court when commenced in the state court. A number of authorities, among them Osborn a. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367; Missis sippi & R. River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403; Searl v. School District No. 2, 124 U. S. 197, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460, and Mineral Range R. Co. v. Detroit & L. S. Copper Co., 25 Fed. 520, are cited in support of an argument, which, in its last analysis, seems to be that although the power of eminent domain resides in the state, nevertheless, when it is delegated to a corporation or individual,
