506
THE GREEN BAG
fraud operates upon the very essentials of the marriage, the court decides that in this instance, the false statement did not in any respect touch or affect any essential of the marriage, and that although complainant may have been misled, the marriage being valid by the law of the land, would not be annulled merely because claimed to be invalid by the law of a church. MARRIAGE. (ANNULMENT — WIFE'S RIGHT TO SUIT MONEY) N. Y. SUP. CT., APP. Div. 30. DEPT. A case almost, if not entirely, without direct precedent, and serving to illustrate the rights of a wife in actions for annulment of marriage, is that of Gore v. Gore, 92 New York Supplement 634. In an action by a wife for annulment of a marriage contract, on the ground of impotence, an order was granted, directing defendant to pay counsel fees to the plaintiff, and in discussing the propriety of this order, the court very clearly differentiates between the rights of the wife in the case at Bar, where, of course, the marriage was valid until judicially determined to be otherwise, and the right of the wife to alimony where the suit for annulment is based upon some ground rendering the marriage utterly void ab initio. The cases of Bloodgood v. Bloodgood, 59 How. Prac. 42, and Meo v. Meo, 2 N. Y. Supp. 565, are referred to, and it is suggested that the holdings therein, that in similar cases the wife was not entitled to alimony pendents lite, are based upon a dictum in Griffin v. Griffin, 47 N. Y. 134, wherein it is said that where the wife denies the existence of the marriage, she cannot consistently claim that the defendant is under any obligation to provide her with means to carry on her suit against him. The Griffin case, however, it is pointed out, is distinguishable from the case at Bar by the fact that in the former case, the action was for annulment on the ground that the defendant (in that case the wife) had a husband living at the time of the marriage to plaintiff. This, of course, would render the second marriage of no effect whatever, and the wife would have no standing to claim alimony or suit money. In the case at Bar, however, the marriage was valid until the wife saw fit to ex ercise her right to have it annulled, and hence she was properly entitled to the expenses of her suit. MASTER AND SERVANT. (LABOR UNIONS — ENJOINING DISCHARGE OF SERVANT) N. Y. SUP. CT., APP. Div., 2D. DEPT. A case reaffirming the doctrine of liberty of contract on facts somewhat different from those
involved in former cases, decided on practically the same principle, is that of Mills v. United States Printing Company of Ohio, 91 New York Supple ment, 185. A strike by the employees of the de fendant printing company had been terminated by an agreement providing that the printing company should not in the future employ any workmen who were not members of a union, and should discharge such as were in its employ if they refused to join the union. Plaintiff, who was an employee, did so refuse, and brought suit to enjoin the printing company from discharging him pursuant to its contract. Injunctive relief was denied. It is argued, in effect, that as neither party to the contract was seeking to avoid it, and as the employer had the right to employ whom it chose, and the employees the right to work for whom they chose, one not a party to the contract by which the conditions of labor were regulated could not be heard to question the validity of that contract merely on the ground that under it he could not be retained as an (jmployee. As suming that the agreement has been performed, it is said that plaintiff has suffered no injury directly traceable to the contract, inasmuch as the employer was free to discharge him in any event, without any reason or for any reasons, which seem to the employer sufficient, no matter how shortsighted or arbitrary. National Protective Ass'n v. dimming, 65 N. Y. Supp. 946, and Mayer v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 20 Atl. 292, are cited in support of the holding, and Reid v. Vanderheyden, 5 Cow. 728; Grant v. Duane, 9 Johns. 391; Baxter v. Baxter, 43 N. J. Eq. 82, 10 Atl. 814, and Cranford v. Tyrell, 128 N. Y. 341, 28 N. E. 514, are referred to with approval as throwing light upon the questions discussed. MASTER AND SERVANT. (RESPONDEAT SU PERIOR) KENTUCKY COURT OP APPEALS. The principle that a master is not liable for the wrongful acts of his servant unless acting within the scope of his authority, is again well illustrated in Mace v. Ashland Coal & Iron Company, 82 Southwestern Reporter, 612. There it was alleged that defendant's servant gave a warning of danger which caused plaintiff to jump from an incline on which he was standing to the deck of a barge, thereby receiving injuries. There was in fact no danger, and the warning was given either mis chievously or maliciously with a design to alarm and terrify plaintiff. It was, however, not alleged that the warning was in any way connected with the servant's duty, or that he represented de fendant in any manner therein, and the court,
