EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT p. 465) an analysis of "The Modern American Cases Arising Out of Trade and Labor Dis putes. " He divides these into cases of strike and of boycott which he carefully defines with further subdivisions depending on 'whether the liability arises from relations of traders with traders, traders with laborers, or laborers with laborers. He summarizes the results of his examination as follows: "Comparing these labor boycott cases with the trade boycott cases, we find that the question whether a boycott of one trader by rival traders is legal is a question in which there is a conflict of authority, but a boycott of a trader by laborers, or others who are not rival traders, has invariably been held illegal. The same line of distinction has been followed in England. The only justification for the distinction lies in the fact that in the labor boycott cases the connection between the acts of the defendants and their own advancement is sometimes one degree more remote than in the boycott by rival traders. The distinc tion, in view of the real facts, is a narrow one, and the writer does not believe it will stand analysis. The boycott is an appeal to force, not an appeal to reason. The force is not physical force, but is none the less an attempt to coerce the will of third persons, so that they will act in a way prejudicial to the plaintiffs' interests. The purpose of selfadvancement in business or trade is one to be encouraged by the law, but it should not be sufficient to excuse harm to others through the coercion of their customers. Of strikes he says: "Though the question of the liability for the harm done to an employer by a sudden and prearranged cessa tion of -work on the part of his employees has never come fairly before the courts, it may be assumed, that if the purpose of the strike is to improve the economic conditions of the laborers, or has something to do with their terms of employment, they are not liable for the resulting harm. Indeed, this assumption has been frequently made by our courts. Whether the strikers would be liable if their purpose vas a purely malicious one is doubtful. It depends upon two questions: First, whether the purpose of an actor should be taken into consideration in solving questions of alleged tort; and, second, admitting that purpose
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should at least in some cases be taken into consideration, whether the act of severing the relations of employer and employee by the latter or by the former should be treated as an act over which the purpose of the actor could have an effect on his legal liability for the consequent harm. These are questions which remain undetermined in our law and on which great confusion exists. Down to the point which we have now reached in the development of the law we notice a sharp contrast in the way in which the law treats a strike and a boycott. The strike, at least for the purpose of economic advancement, is, from the point of view of Civil Law, legal. The boycott, on the other hand, for the same purpose, has usually been considered illegal. Laborers may combine to leave the service of their employer and he cannot recover from them damages for the resulting loss to him; but if they leave him in order to compel him not to deal with a third person, then, though he may have no action against them, the third person has an action." TRUSTS (Precatory Trusts, Wills) THAT there has been a gradual change in the attitude of the English courts toward precatory trusts as shown in a recent decision of the House of Lords is contended by Will C. Smith in the June Juridical Review (V. xvii, p. 145). He says that "it certainly appears that the English courts would now reject the idea of a precatory trust in many cases where it was formerly admitted." Of the true rule the author says: "It seems to be immaterial in principle, al though this may affect the construction of the will, whether the words of desire are addressed to an executor, or a residuary legatee, or a particular legatee. Apart from the particular words employed, the leading considerations against the creation of a trust seem to be (i) uncertainty, as to what the legatee is to do; (2) uncertainty as to what property the alleged trust applies to; (3) doubt as to the extent of the discretion expressly reposed in the alleged trustee; (4) the absence of any gift over in default of an exercise of the dis cretion. But it will be seen that, even where there is no uncertainty or doubt in these respects, the general law is established that
