DEPENDENT SERVICES OF COMMON CARRIERS from the privilege of soliciting passengers upon its station grounds all hackmen except those to whom it has granted an ex clusive right would seem to be the law of England, the federal courts of the United States, and of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Virginia.1 There is again plainly no public duty owed by the railways to the hackmen. The hackmen are not asking for transportation nor are they paying rates. And, ultra vires aside, the railways might, if they chose, establish a cab-service of their own for the further transportation of their pas sengers, and in connection therewith they might exclude all rival carriages from solic iting patronage in their stations. Nor could the hackmen complain if they were all confined behind a bar in an appropriate part of the station, for this would be a reasonable regulation for administering the facilities for the general benefit of the passengers. But a regulation which arbi trarily admits one line of hacks to the sta tion and excludes another is a different matter; and whether this is valid or not depends upon whether it is consistent with the general duty of the carrier or not. 1 Barker v. Midland Ry., 18 C. B. 46; Borst v. Hardie, 23 Viet. Sup. Ct. 479; Pennsylvania Co. v. Donovan, 116 Fed. 907, S. C. 120 Fed. 215, S. C. 124 Fed. 1016; N. Y. N. H. & H. v. Scoville, 71 Conn. 136; Kates & Cab Co., 107 Ga. 636; Old Colony R. R. v. Tripp, 147 Mass. 35, Boston & A. R. R. v. Brown, 177 Mass. 65; Boston & M. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass. 230; Godboutt;. Union Depot, 79 Minn. 188; Hedding v. Gallagher, 72 N. H. 377; Brown v. N. Y. C., 75 Minn. 359, Brown v. R. R., 151 N. Y. 674; N. Y. C. v. Flynn, 74 Hun 124; N. Y. C. v. Sheeley, 27 N. Y. Supp. 185; N. Y. C. v. Warren, 64 N. Y. Supp. 781; Snyder v. Depot Co., 19 Oh. C. C., 368; N. Y., N. H. & H. v. Bork, 23 R. I. 218; Norfolk v. Old Dominion Co., 99 Va. HI. In the following cases, among others, it was held that at all events hackmen bringing pas sengers or coming for passengers on special order must be admitted: Griswold v. Webb, 16 R. I. 649; Sumnutt v. State, Shea 413.
577
VIII
The best case to bring out the argument on the other side, because the most succinct, is State v. Reed (76 Miss. n). From the agreed statement of facts it appeared that there was in connection with the railroad station in the city of Vicksburg a consid erable enclosure; that the railroad com pany had granted to one Perue, exclusive privilege of entering the station grounds in order to solicit passengers; and that hackmen kept thereby outside the enclo sure were, therefore, at great disadvantage. One Reed, a hackman, was arrested for trespassing within the enclosure contrary to the public prohibition made by the rail road company; he was acquitted and ap pealed. Mr. Chief Justice Woods held that the action of the court below in discharging Reed was correct; he sums the matter up thus: "The question is one that affects not only the excluded hackmec, it affects the interests of the public. The upholding of the grant of this exclusive privilege would prevent competition between rival carriers of passengers, create a monopjy in the privileged hackmen, and might produce inconvenience and loss to persons traveling over the railroad, or those having freights transported over it, in cases of exclusion of drays and wagons from its grounds, other than those owned by the person having the exclusive right to enter the railroad's depot grounds. To concede the right claimed by the railroad in the present case would be, in effect, to confer upon the railroad company the control of the trans portation of passengers beyond its own lines, and, in the end, to create a mo nopoly of such business, not granted by its charter, and against the interests of the public. This rule that the railroad may admit favored hackmen to solicit business upon the station premises and exclude all other hackmen would seem to be the established law in Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
