NATURALIZATION of Judge Wheeler just quoted would, of course, be equally applicable to the correc tion by a court of its own record, and the soundness of this position may be fairly questioned, but the entire absence of any power or authority in the federal courts to alter or modify the record or judgment of a state court by a proceeding in which no official of the state is a party, rests upon more solid foundation, and is apparently sound. This phase of the subject has been dwelt upon somewhat fully for the reasons, that the law with regard to it is still apparently in a somewhat unsettled condition, and also because it serves to emphasize the impor tance of cautious and well-considered action when dealing with such cases, cases which almost universally are conducted as ex partc proceedings, but the consequences of which may be of great importance. Thus far the consideration has been of principles where the pathway has been fairly clear. But in connection with natur alization, just as with other branches of the law, the difficulty is not so much in the determination of principles, as the applica tion of them. The statute after prescribing the required length of residence, and declar ation of intention in certain cases, then imposes in effect three qualifications to which the applicant must measure up: (I) that he is of good moral character; (II) that he is attached to the principles of the Consti tution of this country, and (III) that he is well-disposed to the good order and happi ness of the government. For the correct interpretation of each of these, every court is a law unto itself, and inevitably there is no uniformity of construc tion, and but too often in practice they are treated as merely formal and are slurred over in a most prefunctory manner. It would be idle to attempt to work out a harmony of interpretation, or even to recite the various conceptions which have been expressed of the significance of those phrases. But there are one or two observations which can be
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made with regard to them in the light of the adjudicated cases. I. Good Moral Character. This is not presumed, but must be sup ported by proof (In re Bodek, 63 Fed. Rep. 813). We are so in the habit of applying the rule of the criminal law with regard to the presumption of innocence to every thing which affects character, that the natural tendency is to say that the good character of an applicant for naturalization will be presumed, but this is error, it is a . requisite qualification just as much as resi dence and to be proved in the same way. What standard shall be applied is a very different question, but this much may be confidently asserted, that one who has been convicted of a felony does not possess such character as will permit a court to naturalize him. Such conviction stamps the char acter of the individual ineffaceably so that even executive pardon will not rehabilitate the person. The length of time for which such good character must be shown may have been formerly open to debate though it had been judicially held that it applied to the entire period of the residence of the applicant in the United States (In re Spen cer, Fed. Cas., No. 13,234). This rule now seems the proper one in view of the restric tions imposed by the immigration act de signed to debar any convicted of crimes in lands of their nativity from landing on our shores. Nor is it necessary in order to determine that an applicant is not of good moral character that he shall have been convicted of a felony. An habitual violator of the laws, though the character of the offense be not so serious, will have the like effect, and it has, therefore, been held that habitual gaming, or selling of liquors, where these were forbidden by statute, would be sufficient derogation from the moral char acter of the applicant to make his rejection proper (In re Spencer, Fed. Cas., No. 13,234). And in like manner an alien who lives in a state of polygamy, or believes that poly gamy may be rightfully practiced in defi
