EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT Leibnitz is contributed by Sir John Macdonnell, to the Journal of the Society of Compara tive Legislation (No. xiv, p. 283.) The author finds a great similarity between the theories and labors of his subject and those of his con temporary Bacon, and especially controverts the inference natural in consequence of his fame as a philosopher that he was a theorist and insists that the impression from reading his legal works is all in favor of his practical sagacity. He particularly detested the schol asticism of the lawyers of his time and his great work was to purge the law of chaotic conditions and barren subtleties and to sim plify jurisprudence. In his remarks on legal education he insists on the necessity of pre paring the student for action and recommends moot courts and the importance of general knowledge. He did his best also to create an accurate and stable terminology of inter national law. In conclusion the author says: "Leibnitz had book-learning and its rare companion, a desire to keep in touch with facts. He sought to bring jurisprudence into line with other sciences. He was interested in its philosophy, versed in its history. He had always present the great object of law, to do justice between men; he rediscovered, it may be said, justice beneath the formalities and technicalities of his time; if he resembled Seiden or Savigny, he also resembled Bentham. He anticipated more or less clearly many of the future developments of juris prudence, and some even now dimly seen, and only by a few." BIOGR APHY. " Lord Monboddo : A Judicial Metaphysician," by Henry H. Brown, Judicial Review (V. xvii, p. 267). CONFLICT OF LAWS (Jurisdiction). An ar ticle of some interest to English lawyers as well as to students of comparative jurispru dence is a discussion of "Jurisdiction Rationc Originis" in the Scotch law by George Duncan in the September Juridical Review <V. xvii, p. 254). "It was indeed a marked feature of the English common law that it recognized only one sure foundation of jurisdiction in such actions, viz., the actual presence of the dé fendent within the realm at the time of ser vice of the writ. "Scots law. on the other hand, has always
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recognized a number of possible grounds of jurisdiction against a defender furth of Scot land, and if such a defender chanced to be a native Scotsman, that circumstance weighed heavily, in the early cases, in favor of juris diction being sustained against him. On a correct interpretation of these cases, however, nativity was not of itself regarded as a suf ficient ground of jurisdiction. It may be taken as clear that neither the Scots domicile nor the Scots nationality of a defender will found jurisdiction in a petitory action, unless he is in Scotland when the action is served. The Court of Session may have jurisdiction to divorce a man against whom they have no jurisdiction whatever to pronounce decree for a civil debt." From an examination of the authorities the author decides that "the result, however, is that there is authority for the proposition that both domicile of origin and allegiance will found jurisdiction if combined with per sonal citation, and it does not appear that there is any reason in principle for drawing a distinction between domicile of origin and domicile of choice as a foundation for juris diction in such circumstances. But if a de fender, originally Scots, abandons his Scots domicile and his nationality, he must be re garded as a foreigner against whom jurisdiction will not be sustained unless founded in some of the other recognized modes. A more difficult question arises where the defender has lost his Scots domicile of origin without also losing his nationally, it being assumed that, for the purposes of local jurisdiction, Scots nationality can be regarded as some thing distinct from the common allegiance which all British subjects, whether Scotch, English, Irish, or Colonials, owe to the Crown. It is suggested that, apart from the obiter opinion of Lord Kinloch in Kcrmick's case, and the opinion of Lord Low in Tasker v. Grieve, in neither of which cases was the question of allegiance considered, there is not yet any distinct authority for affirming that the mere loss of domicile would of itself be sufficient to free a Scot from his natural obli gation to submit himself to the courts of his country when personally cited thereto in Scot land. It is possible, however, that the gen eral tendency of our courts to regard domicile
