NOTES OF RECENT CASES appellants, who was the oil inspector for that county, for aid and advice. These two gentle men then proceeded to do everything in their power to break up the business of the appellee Doyle. It seems that they threatened the whole sale customers of Doyle to shut them up in busi ness if they continued to purchase and deal with him. They threatened both the wholesale and retail customers that the Standard Oil Company would refuse to sell them oil, gasoline and other commodities so long as they continued to pur chase such articles from the appellee. The oil in spector charged that the oil being sold was below the standard required by law, and had Doyle ar rested on various charges of violating the ordi nances and the criminal and penal laws of the commonwealth. Upon the trial for these offenses the charges were dismissed. The Standard Oil Company went to one Griffith, the third appellant, who was running an oil route and purchasing his oil from Doyle, and offered him a rebate of one cent a gallon if he would ship back to Doyle the oil which he had purchased from him, threatening that if he did not they would put wagons on the route in opposition to him and ruin his trade. Griffith returned the oil and formed a partnership with the oil inspector. They received two wagons from the Standard Oil Company to be used in peddling the company's oil. These wagons were run in opposition to Doyle's wagons, and the proof shows that they obstructed, annoyed and harassed the drivers of Doyle, by following them, sometimes going in front of them, stopping at every place where they stopped, going into the residences with Doyle's drivers, and there offer ing to sell oil at a cheaper rate, even offering to give their oil without charge if the consumers would not purchase of Doyle. Sometimes they would stand for hours at one place awaiting the movement of Doyle's driver. The appellants con tended that their acts were legitimate and were solely for the purpose of building up their own business, and that if the appellee suffered any damage as a result thereof, it was such a loss as would not support an action of damages, and cited many cases. The court discusses these cases at length, distinguishing them from the case at bar, and states that it was shown by the evidence that a purpose was accomplished by unlawful means, and when the relation of the parties is considered, their manifest motives of self-interest, the manner in which the purpose was carried out, and the declarations of the parties, it is reasonable to infer that this purpose was accomplished by concert of action and conspiracy. The court sustains the action of the lower court in submitting the ques tion of damages to the jury, and refuses to set
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aside a verdict of $2,300 against the Standard Oil Company, on the ground that a verdict of only $300 against the oil inspector shows that the ac tion of the jury in the case of the Standard Oil Company was the result of passion and prejudice. The court refers to Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v, Standard Oil Co., 42 Hun, 153, Murray v. MacGarigle, 69 Wis. 483, 34 N. W. 522, West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611, 40 S. E. 591, 56 L. R. A. 804, 88 Am. St. Rep. 895, and also to other cases from New Jersey, Maine and Tennessee. DOMICILE. CIALS.)
(NAVAL OFFICERS AND OTHER OFFI
KENTUCKY COURT OF APPEALS. A holding, which, if applied to various phases of the law of domicile, may be of general interest, owing to our recently acquired insular possessions, and the number of American soldiers, sailors and government employés who have gone thither, ap pears in Radford v. Radford, 82 Southwestern Re porter 391. Plaintiff was a naval officer in the service of the United States, and was at the time of the institu tion of the action in active service in the Philip pines. The defendant, his wife, resided in the City of New York, and the action was brought against her for divorce. The question of juris diction was raised, and the court said: "The evi dence shows the residence of appellant to have been in Christian County, Ky. He is a native of that county, owning property and paying taxes there, and had never claimed either a legal or actual residence elsewhere. Being in the naval service of his country, he is necessarily out of his native state whenever his duty calls him. He obeys the orders of his superiors, and goes when and where they direct. It has never been the policy of the law to add to the burdens of one serving his country in the army or navy the loss of residence in his native state from his con strained and involuntary absence therefrom. Such a one cannot be said, in any proper sense of the term, to have a residence anywhere other than the home he has left, since he has no choice as to where he goes, the time he can remain, or when he shall return. In order to gain either an actual or legal residence, there is, of necessity, involved at least the exercise of volition in its selection, and this cannot be affirmed of the residence of either a soldier or sailor in active service." The logic of the case would seem to make its reasoning applicable to cases of government em ployés other than military officers, who are ordered to our dependencies. The case of Tipton v. Tipton, 8 S. W. 440, in
