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THE GREEN BAG

for the purpose of exercising such use is founded upon, or is the result of some peculiar condition of the soil or climate or other peculiarity of the state where the right of condemnation is asserted under a state statute, the court is always, where it can fairly be done, strongly inclined to hold with the state courts when they uphold a statute providing for such condemnation. Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Brewer dissented.

trains thereon. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court holds that the taking without compensation of plaintiff's easements of light and air by means of the elevated structure is an im pairment of the obligation of his contract, for bidden by the Federal Constitution.

Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in this case, con siders the decision an unwarranted extension of the doctrine of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, i Wall. 222 [1864]. In this the learned justice appears to be wrong. When a state court gives effect to a sub CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Obligation of Con sequent statute alleged to impair the obligation of tracts — Effect of Judicial Decisions.) U. S. S. C. a contract, the Federal courts have always exer —r A case which well illustrates the fact that the cised an independent judgment in passing upon law is not always an exact science, and that its the validity and effect of the contract, even though application even by the most learned of judges is this required an interpretation of the common or attended not only with considerable difficulty, but statute law of the state. This exception to the with a reasonable amount of uncertainty as well, rule that the federal courts will ordinarily accept is that of Muhlker v. New York &r Harlem R.Co., as conclusive a state court's construction of its 25 Supreme Court Reporter, 522. The action own statutes or real property law is considerably originated in New York, and the Supreme Court, older than Gelpcke v. Dubuque. It was stated by Appellate Division, affirmed a judgment for plain Taney in Ohio Insurance Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. tiff with Van Brunt, P. J., dissenting. On appeal 416, 432-33 [1853], was unanimously applied in to the Court of Appeals the judgment of the Ap Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, i Black, 436, 443 [1862], pellate Division was reversed with Bartlctt and and has been constantly followed since. Stearns Cullen, J. J., dissenting, and on error to the v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 233 [1900], citing United States Supreme Court the judgment of the cases. It is applied to cases on writs of error to New York Court of Appeals was reversed with state courts, as well as to those coming from the four justices concurring, one justice concurring in federal circuit courts, while the rule in Gelpcke the result, and four justices dissenting. The ex v. Dubuque can be invoked in the latter only. planation of this conflict in opinion is to be found Railway v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511 [1871]. The in the fact that the case is one of considerable Supreme Court has never suggested that its inde difficulty, involving as it does, a further extension pendent judgment may not be as properly exer of a principle which, as Mr. Justice Holmes re cised in interpreting unwritten property law as marks in his dissenting opinion, "it took the court statute law, and it is in the exercise of this judg a good while to explain." Plaintiff sued to en ment that the majority in the Muhlker case fol join the use of an elevated railroad structure lows the earlier New York decisions holding that unless payment should be first made for ease grantees from New York City of land abutting on ments of light and air, which it was alleged the a street have a contract easement of light, air, and elevated structure destroyed. Plaintiff's prop access. 197 U. S. at 570. This may or may not erty abutted on a street in New York City, and. have been a correct construction of the alleged con he derived his title from the person who had tract, but it involves no novel proposition of con granted the street to the city in trust for a public stitutional law, nor does it decide, as Mr. Justice highway. At the time plaintiff acquired title the Holmes seems to think, that state courts may not state courts had decided that one so situated had constitutionally reverse their decisions upon the a contract right to easements of light, air, and faith of which property rights have been acquired. access, which could not be taken away from him 197 U. S. at 574. without compensation by the construction of an James P. Hall. elevated railroad in the adjoining street. At the time of the conveyance, however, defendant rail CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Obligation of Con road company operated a surface railroad in the street which considerably interfered with the tracts — Special Franchise Tax.) U. S. S. C N. Y. Laws, 1899, c. 712, imposing a special plaintiff's easement of access. Thereafter, by com mand of the state, expressed in New York Laws, franchise tax, is not, it is held, objectionable on 1892, c. 339, an elevated structure was built in the ground that it impairs the obligation of con tracts by which the state or municipality had lieu of the surface road-bed, and defendant com pany by authority of the statute operated its previously granted the right to construct, operate,.