NOTES OF RECENT CASES liability and non-liability of the insurer is thus drawn by the court at the point where the actual burning of the insured property commences. V
This decision is interesting because of its bearing upon the doctrine of "death wound," which had its origin in Marine Insurance. Knights v. Faith, 15 Q. B. 649 [1850]; i Arnould on Marine Insurance, $ 437. The doctrine of death wound has very reasonably been carried over into Fire Insurance. Yet it is merely a doctrine as to the amount of recovery; and it is not applicable until it has been made to appear that within the lifetime of the policy some loss to the subject matter, and of the sort insured against, had already begun. The decision in the principal case thus harmonizes with the doctrines of death wound. It harmonizes also with the law of Life Insurance, as developed in Howell v. Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co., 44 N. Y. 276 [1871], where about two hours before the expiration of the policy the person whose life was insured was so fatally stricken with disease that he died on the next day, and where the court overthrew a contention that within the meaning of a life insurance policy this person was in effect dead before the policy expired. Eugene Wambaugh. LARCENY. (Conspiracy to Cheat Under Color of a Bet.) Ark. — The case of Johnson v. State, 88 Southwestern Reporter, 905, presents the crime of larceny in a form which, while not en tirely without precedent, is, nevertheless, unusual. The evidence showed that the prosecuting wit ness was induced by defendant to bet money on a foot-race, it being represented to prosecuting witness that the runner on whom he was to bet would win the race, although the other contestant, who was supposed to be the representative of a club, was a favorite in the betting. The prose cutor was induced to believe that he would thereby be enabled to win large sums from the members of the club, and he was persuaded to furnish money on representations that the money was to be re turned to him, and not really bet, and that he was to get a share of the winnings as compensa tion for aiding the defendant and his confeder ates. The runner on whom the money belonging to prosecuting witness was bet, lost the race, of course, and appellant refused to return prosecu tor's money. The obtaining of the money under these circumstances was held to constitute lar ceny. The action of the trial court, in admitting evidence of similar transactions by defendant at other places, prior to the commission of the offense on which the prosecution was founded, is
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sustained on the ground that it tended to prove system and show design. Whether obtaining money by fraudulent bet is larceny depends on whether it is to be deposited as a stake, or paid as consideration for a chance of winning, as in case of a pool. The ordinary bet, like this, is the deposit of a stake; possession only is parted with, and the act is larceny. J. H. B. This case is worth notice for the clear cut and careful distinction that it draws between larceny and false pretenses. The jury having found that the money was deposited by the victim with the stakeholder merely as a form, the latter at most acquired only possession; it is possible from the facts that all that was given him was custody. In either event the fact that at the time he got the money he intended to keep it, made it larceny, in the one case by trick, in the other because there was never even a fraudulently induced consent to part with possession: P. v. Shaughnessy, no Cal. 598., 43 P. 2; S. v. Skilbrick, 25 Wash. 555, 66 P. 53. On the other hand, had the victim been induced to believe that he had lost and so consent to let his money go, parting with both possession and title, this would have been an equally clear case of false pretenses, Rex v. Nicholson Leach 3d. ed. 698. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. (Statutes — Contracts — Competitive Bidding.) Ind. App. Ct. — A decision upon a point which seems to have been a matter of first impression in Indiana, is rendered by the Appellate Court of that state in the case of Monaghan v. City of Indianapolis, 75 N. E. Rep. 33. The question is whether, under a statute requiring a municipal board of public works to let contracts for street improvements to the lowest and best bidder after advertising for bids, the city has power to specify that a street shall be paved with a patented pavement. Two of the earliest cases on this point, both cited by the Indiana Court, are Hobart v. City of Detroit, 17 Mich. 246, in which the power to let such a contract is affirmed, and Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590, in which the power is denied. The Indiana court follows the latter case, holding that the city has not power to specify a patented pave ment, even though the owner of the patent agrees to furnish the necessary material to any contractor equipped to lay the same, or who will equip him self to lay it, at a specified price, and to furnish free of charge an expert to supervise the prep aration of the material. The obvious effect of this holding is to prevent the use of any patented
