THE GREEN BAG cian and patient, and because of which the law makes privileged any information which conies to the physician under such circumstances, can ex ist in a case where the patient is an unwilling one, having taken a dose of poison with the intention of committing suicide, and where he resents the efforts of the physician to save his life, was con sidered in the case of Meyer v. Supreme Lodge, K. P., 70 Northeastern Reporter in, and de cided by a divided court. It seems that Meyer had gone to a hotel and taken a dose of Roughon-Rats for the purpose of ending his life. He was discovered by one of the attendants of the hotel, who immediately sent for a doctor. Judge Vann, who wrote the majority opinion, sees the matter in the following light: A learned doctor was called as a physician; he attended as a physi cian; he made a diagnosis as a physician; and he administered remedies as a physician. In all that he did he acted in a professional capacity. While it is true that in all he did he acted against the will and in spite of the remonstrance of the man whose condition imperatively called for profes sional treatment, still the meeting was profes sional in nature, and all that he said or did was strictly in the line of his profession. Was the subject any the less a patient within the meaning and object of the statute because he was forced to submit to ministrations designed to save his life? Was the doctor guilty of assault when he gave the hypodermic injection? Was he bound to leave him there to die without an effort to help him? Was the statute designed to protect only those who are treated by consent, but not those treated through necessity? Does it not mean by a "pa tient" at least one who is consciously treated by a physician, even without his consent, when the facts tend to show that through bodily suffering his mind had partially lost its hold? Either the doctor was the physician of Mr. Meyer, or he com mitted an assault upon him, and was guilty of a crime. If the wife of the deceased had called the doctor, she would have acted as an agent by im plied authority. The bell boy who in fact called him also acted on implied authority. While the doctor in either case could have retired, if he re mained in authority, he remained as a physician, and the sick man became his patient, and he was acting in a professional capacity when, as a duly licensed physician, he actually treated Mr. Meyer as a patient. When one who is sick unto death is in fact treated by a physician as a patient, even against his will, he becomes the patient of that physician by operation of law. The same is true of one who is unconscious and unable to speak for himself. The fact that the patient told the doctor several times to let him alone, that he wished to
die, and expressed himself in a brutal and profane manner, does not negative the existence of the relation of physician and patient. Judge Vann cites with approval the case of Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 573, 9 N. E. 320, where another physician was called by the attending physician and went in his professional capacity to see the patient, and the case of People v. Murray, 101 . Y. 126, 4 N. E. 326, where a physician was sent by the district attorney to attend a patient upon whom a criminal assault had been committed. Cases where physicians have been sent to report upon the sanity of a prisoner are also cited, it bepointed out that if the physician prescribes for the prisoner the statements of the latter are pro tected, and if he does not prescribe they are not protected. Judge Gray dissents and says that it seems difficult to assert, with any gravity of countenance at least, with Meyer rejecting the witness's presence and services and cursing him for his interference, and with the doctor's deter mined efforts to prevent Meyer from dying in the hotel, whose servants had summoned him, that the relation of physician and patient arose, and that the confidential relation existed which the statute has in view, and which, with a tender solicitude for a patient's interests, it is designed to safeguard. The recent case of Griffiths v. Met ropolitan St. R. Co., 171 N. Y. 106, 63 N. E. 808, is cited as one somewhat in point and controlling in the present instance. RAILROAD TICKETS. (DELAY IN USING — LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.) TEXAS COURT OP CIVIL APPEALS. The question whether a first class unlimited railroad ticket is good until used is probably passed upon for the first time in the case of Cassiano v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 82 South western Reporter, 806. The ticket in question was presented fourteen years after it had been issued, and had been purchased by the appellant from an acquaintance, who had found it among some papers of his deceased father. When the ticket was presented it was refused, and as the appellant was not able to pay the fare demanded, he was ejected from the train, in the middle of the night, at a small station between Houston and San Antonio. He was delayed here until money could be sent to him, and as a result of this delay, he lost a position to which he was going in San Antonio. The court points out that the vital question at issue is whether the appellant was en titled to a seat by virtue of the ticket presented by him, it appearing that no unnecessary force was used in ejecting him. The statute of limita tions was pleaded by the railroad company. It
