NOTES OF RECENT CASES dence was not in their possession or under their control because their possession was not personal but was that of the corporation. The act of February 25, 1903, is also construed, and it is held that the right of a witness to claim his privilege against self-incrimination afforded by United States Constitution, 5th Amendment, when ex amined concerning an alleged violation of the Arti-Trust Act is taken away by the proviso to the act of February 25, to the effect that no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence in any pro ceedings, suit, or prosecution, under certain named statutes, of which the Anti-Trust Act is one. This proviso, it is held, furnishes a sufficient immunity from prosecution to satisfy the consti tutional guaranty, although it may not afford immunity from prosecution in the state courts for the offense disclosed. INSURANCE. (Additional Insurance — Eighty PerCent Clause.) Mass. — The effect of the now quite common eighty per cent average or co-insur ance clause on a condition prohibiting other insurance is passed on in the recent case of Woolford v. Phenix Insurance Company, 76 North eastern Reporter, 722. The court takes the posi tion that the two clauses are not necessarily inconsistent, but that, to a certain extent at least. they can stand together, each having its due scope. In support of this proposition is cited Cutler v. Royal Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 566, 40 Atl. 529, 41 L. R. A. 159, and also Allen v. Germania American Ins. Co., 123 N. Y. 6, 25 N. E. 309. Applying the principle thus stated, the court holds that a policy containing the above-mentioned clauses is vio lated if insured procures additional insurance so as to make the total insurance exceed the entire value of the property. The court announces its refusal to follow Pool v. Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co., 91 Wis. 530, 65 N. W. 54, 51 Am. St. Rep. 919, and Catoosa Springs v. Linch, 18 Misc. Rep. 210, 41 N. Y. Sup. 377, in so far as they are incon sistent with the conclusion arrived at. The 80 per cent average or coinsurance clause is of recent origin, but has, nevertheless, been liti gated in several cases with reference to its effect on the usual policy provision prohibiting other insurance without the insurer's consent. In the Cutler case it was held that the policy was for feited as insured had taken out insurance in ex cess of 80 per cent of the value of the property insured. And a similar doctrine was announced in the Allen case with reference to a clause per mitting other insurance up to a stated amount. In the Poole Case the court simply held that the
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80 per cent clause impliedly authorized other in surance, especially as the insured's agent was in strumental in placing the additional insurance procured. But it does not appear that the total insurance exceeded So per cent of the value of the property. This case can, therefore, be consid ered to hold that the 80 per cent clause only authorizes other insurance to that extent. And this view is supported by the Catoosa Springs Case and Nestler v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. Supp. 29. It should also be noted that in the Woolford and Cutler cases the court intimates that in a proper case the 80 per cent clause might be regarded as superseding the forfeiture clause so as to permit insurance to the extent of 80 per cent. The various authorities therefor do not appear to be in open conflict with one another. On the other hand they may be regarded to be in harmony and to support what is unquestionably the true doctrine that where a policy prohibiting other insurance contains an 80 per cent average or coinsurance clause, the clause prohibiting the taking out of other insurance without the in surer's consent is waived, in so far as to permit other insurance in an amount which, together with the policy containing the clause, does not exceed 80 per cent of the value of the property insured, but that the forfeiture clause is not waived beyond this. G. H. INSURANCE. (Mutual Companies — Reorgan ization.) Wis. — In a lengthy opinion by Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin lays down several interesting propositions of law rela tive to the reorganization of mutual life insurance companies. Huber v. Martin, 105 Northwestern Reporter, 1031. A mutual insurance company having a charter provision to the effect that mem bership could only be created by accepting a policy and could only continue until the end of the policy period, transacted business for some time and accumulated a considerable surplus. A statute was then enacted authorizing a reorgani zation, under a general law for the creation of insurance corporations, with the consent of two thirds of the existing policy holders, representing at least one half the outstanding insurance. The reorganized concern was to be the owner of the property of the superseded company for its use in the conduct of its business. The act further provided that any existing policy holder of the mutual company, in case of its being superseded, should be entitled at his option to take stock in the new company to the extent of such part of the total stock as the amount paid by him on his policy bore to the total amount of risks in force, or to receive such proportion of the surplus as the
