112
THE GREEN BAG
CURRENT
LEGAL
LITERATURE
This department is designed to call attention to the articles in all the leading legalperiodicals of the preceding month and to new law books sent us for review. Conducted by William C. Gray, of Fall River, Mass. Among the recent legal articles those of the widest general interest are perhaps Herbert Pope's " The Legal Aspect of Monopoly " in the Harvard Law Review, and Wm. Trickett's American Law Review paper on "The Non-Federal Law As Administered in the Federal Courts." George P. Costigan, Jr.'s, two articles on Quasi-contracts, one in the Harvard and the other in the Columbia Law Review, are able discussions of narrower scope, as are also Frederick Dwight's suggestions, as to " Capital and Capital Stock," and Albert M. Kales' comments on Professor Gray's second edition of his " Rule Against Perpetuities." Like the last named, Joseph W. Bingham's " Suggestions Concerning the Law of Fixtures" covers so many points as to be incapable of adequate treatment in a department of this nature, but deserves a close reading by those who are interested in those special subjects. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. "American Administrative Tribunals," by Harold M. Bowman, Political Science Quarterly (V. xxi, p. 609). ADVERTISING. "The Law Concerning Advertising," by " A. D. D.," Scottish Law Review (V. xxiii, p. 1). ARBITRATION. " United Nations of the World," by George C. Gregory, Virginia Law Register (V. xii, p. 595). BIOGRAPHY. " James Valentine Camp bell," byC. A. Kent, in the January Michigan Law Review (V. v, p. 1 6 1 ), is the first of a series of papers to be published in that magazine on four distinguished justices of the Supreme Court of Michigan — the others being Christiancy, Cooley, and Graves. Mr. Kent knew Judge Campbell well and has given an appre ciative but discriminating sketch of his friend, who sat for thirty-two successive years in the highest court of the state. How far he is from conventional adulation the following division of judges into two classes and his inclusion of Judge Campbell as often among those having the first described tendency shows. The extract is also of general interest apart from its special application: "There are two important and distinct judicial tendencies, both of which may appear at different times in the same judge, but one or the other of which make the prevailing ten dency of his mind and largely contributes to his judicial character.
"The first leads the judge to ascertain from his sense of justice, or any other powerful con viction, operating, perhaps, unconsciously on his mind, the result at which he wishes to arrive and, having determined this, then to make in his opinion the best argument he can to sustain this result. This is the method in which many opinions are obtained and defended. Our interests or our prejudices lead us to adopt certain views, and we then defend them, according to the measure of our abilities. The contrarieties of opinion among able lawyers are largely produced by their retainers. The desire to decide each case by itself, according to the feeling of the judge, leads to the forgetfulness of general principles and to distinctions between the cases so subtle that they are no guide to the inquirer. "The second method by which judges reach their decision, is by inquiring what legal princi ples are applicable to the case at hand. These principles should be arrived at by a considera tion of the statutes or precedents, or where no rule can be found in either of these then by the development of a rule which will be a wise and just one for future cases as well as for that at bar. No doubt a deep sense of justice should pervade the mind of the judge who is looking for a legal rule, but it is the justice of a rule not applicable to the case at bar alone, but to all other like cases, a rule which shall make the law as certain as is possible. "It is very likely that judges, who are in fluenced by the first tendency, will decide
