NOTES OF RECENT CASES ahead for vehicles and pedestrians and on the first appearance of danger to take proper steps to avert it." Rapp v. Transit Co., 190 Mo., loc. cit. 161, 88 S. W. 865, and cases cited: Sluder v. Tran sit Co., 189 Mo., loc. cit. 136, 88 S. W. 648; Riska v. Railroad, 180 Mo. 169, 79 S. W. 445; Sepetowski v. Transit Co., 102 Mo. App., loc. cit. 119, 76 S. W. 693CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Commerce.) U. S. Sup. Ct. — A state railroad commission's regu lation requiring a railway company to stop its interstate mail trains at a specified county seat where proper and adequate railway passenger facilities are otherwise afforded at that station is an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce, according to Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90. The court says, the matter of the validity of statutes directing railroad com panies to stop certain of rrieir trains at stations named has been before it several times and the result of the cases is: That a statute of Illinois, which required the Illinois Central Railroad to stop its fast mail train from Chicago to New Orleans at Cairo, in the state of Illinois, which was a county seat, was unconstitutional if the company had made adequate accommodation by other trains for interstate passengers to and from Cairo. That a statute which required every railroad corpora tion to stop all regular passenger trains running wholly within the state at its stations at all county seats was a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state, where the statute did not apply to railroad trains entering the state from any other state, or transcontinental trains of any railroad. A statute relating to railroad companies which provided that a company should cause three of its trains each way, if so many were run daily, Sundays excepted, to stop at a station containing over three thousand inhabitants, was valid in the absence of legislation by Congress on the subject; and also a state statute which required all regular passenger trains to stop at county seats was invalid when applied to an inter state train, intended only for through passengers from St. Louis to New York, when it appeared that the railroad company furnished sufficient trains to accommodate all the local through business in the state, and where such trains stopped at county seats. These principles have been decided in Illinois C. R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142, 41 L. Ed. 107, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1096; Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 41 L. Ed. 1064, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 627; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 43 L. Ed. 702, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465; Cleveland C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Illinois, 177 U. S. 514, 44 L. Ed. 868, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722.
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There was need for the above case to explain if not to reconcile the cases which had preceded it and which are referred to therein. Having it we are able to determine quite clearly the question as to how far the state may go in compelling railroads to accommodate its local needs without interfering with the prerogative of Congress. It now seems clear that where the railroad is entirely within the state the Supreme Court of the Nation will seldom interfere with the discretion of the State Legis latures and will sustain laws which have any appearance of reasonableness. It will, for instance, sustain a state statute which requires all regular passenger trains running wholly within the state to stop at all the county seats they pass and will not inquire into the fact as to whether such county seats have, without the stopping of all such passenger trains, adequate accommodation. Gladsen v. State of Minnesota, 166 U. S. 427, 17 S. Ct. 627. Where, however, interstate commerce is concerned, and especially where the carriage of the United States mails is affected, the United States Supreme Court does not seem to be willing to bow to the discretion of the local legislature, of the local railroad commissions, or even of the local courts. In such cases the Supreme Court recognizes the fact that the people of the state through which the road passes have the right to demand that the railroad shall reasonably sub serve their local interests, and can therefore insist that even in the case of interstate lines enough trains shall stop at any particular point to reason ably accommodate its needs. In such cases they hold that the regulations providing for such reasonable accommodations are at the most merely an incidental interference with interstate com merce. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Rail road Co. v. State of Ohio, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465. In no case, however, will the Supreme Court concede the right, where interstate commerce or the carriage of the mails is concerned, to require all trains to stop at any place no matter how large, where the needs of such place are otherwise reasonably complied with; nor, indeed, will they generally sustain statutes at all which require mail trains to stop at places designated by the local authorities. If such places are not properly served, the remedy, the Supreme Court suggests, is for the state authorities to compel the company to run more trains, rather than to interfere with their interstate traffic by stopping those which are required to make a fast schedule between distant points. Andrew A. Bruce. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. (Commerce, Trade Unions.) U. S. D. C. for W. D. of Ky. — In several states, laws have been enacted by which employers have been prohibited from discriminating against members of trade unions seeking employ
