198
THE GREEN BAG
Writ are quoted to show that the first Christians held property in common. The attorney-general in maintaining that the society's ownership and management of property was not for religious purposes, contended that religion pertains to the spiritual belief and welfare of man as distinguished from his physical wants and necessities; that it relates to the ethics of life and to the hope and belief in immortality; that secular business and pursuits upon the other hand are those pertaining to the material and physical wants of man, and are clearly distinguished from things spiritual or holy. The court concedes that theoretically the dis tinctions pointed out may be correct, and then points out that practical religion may not be so completely separated from the affairs of this life. Furthermore, it was argued that the organization and maintenance of the society was obnoxious to sound public policy: but the court while it con cedes that the status of the individual members of the society is not in accordance with the pre vailing American ideals cites numerous decisions in support of the doctrine that such an association and its trusteeship of property is not against public policy. Such decisions are in part : Schriber v. Rapp, 5 Watts 351; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana 170; Waite v. Merrill, 2 Greenl. 102. Secular pursuits, such as those conducted by the society in question, the court says are not ordinarily to be regarded as incidental to the power of religious corporations for the very good reason that ordinarily they bear no necessary relation to the creed it is organized to promote. But, where the ownership of property and the management of business enterprises are in pursuance thereof and in comformity with an essential article of religious faith, these cannot be held, in the absence of any evidence of injurious results, to be in excess of the powers conferred by the law upon corporations. Under the blessings of free government every citizen should be per mitted to pursue that mode of life which is dictated by his own conscience, and if this also be exacted by an essential dogma or doctrine of his religion, a corporation organized to enable him to meet the requirement of his faith is a religious corporation and as such may own property and may carry on enterprises appropriate to its creation. COUNTY OFFICERS. (Per Diem Compensa tion.) If. D. — As in many states, county and township officers often receive no stated salary, but are allowed a per diem compensation for their services, it quite frequently becomes important to determine what constitutes a day's work for which compensation would be allowed. A recent case in which this question is discussed is that of State v. Richardson, 109 N. W. Rep. 1026. In this case it appeared that by law the county com missioners were to be allowed a stated sum per
day for the time they were necessarily employed in the duties of their office, and mileage for the distance actually traveled in attending the meet ings of the board and when engaged in their official duties. The commissioners had been accustomed to charge the county for overtime when they were out on their official duties at night, and had charged and collected per diem and mileage for one day coming to commissioners' meetings, and per diem and mileage for one day going from such meetings. As a result of this practice it was alleged that one commissioner had collected for not less than thirty-six days' services in one month. This custom, the court held, could not be upheld under the law by which the com missioners were allowed per diem compensation, as there was no provision that less than twentyfour hours should constitute a day's work. Unless the contrary is provided by the statute, a day extends over the twenty-four hours from one midnight to the next midnight, and a commissioner cannot charge and collect for two days' official services performed within the twenty-four hours from midnight to midnight. Robinson v. Dunn, 77 Cal. 473, 19 Pac. 878; Smith v. County Com missioners, 10 Colo. 17, 13 Pac. 917. CRIMINAL LAW. (Larceny.) Wis. — The necessity of showing trespass in a prosecution for larceny is prominently brought out in Topolewski v. State, 109 N. W. Rep. 1037. In this case, ac cused had conceived a plan to obtain by criminal means and through the aid of another, some of the products of a packing company, but the plan was abandoned, the confederate having disclosed it to the packing company. Subsequently, however, a meeting was arranged between the confederate and accused, the packing company having requested the confederate to bring it about, and at such interview accused proposed to his confederate that the latter should procure some packages of meat to be placed on the packing company's loading platform, and that accused should drive to the platform and remove the packages. This proposition the confederate reported to the pack ing company, which caused the meat to be placed on the loading platform, and notified the persons in charge of the platform to let the meat go as it was for a man who would call for it. When the accused arrived and loaded the meat he was not interfered with by the one in charge of the load ing platform. Under these facts the court held that accused was not guilty of larceny, as the element of trespass was wanting, and in support of its position cites Rex v. Eggington, 2 P. & P. 508, and Williams v. State, 55 Ga. 391. In the latter case it was held that the owner of property may make everything ready and easy for the larceny thereof by one purposing to steal the same, and
