NOTES OF RECENT CASES others to make all lawful use thereof. In support thereof is cited Raymond v. Keseberg, 84 Wis. 302, 54 N. W. 612; Van O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 292. Continuing, the court says: " The presence of a vehicle in the street, while entirely lawful, is not exclusive of the right of another to be there, nor does such lawfulness absolve the owner from the duty of due care toward the other. Why should lawfulness of building materials have any greater effect? We cannot at all agree with the proposition that, because defendant had placed some materials within the limits of Jefferson Street, all others using the street were trespasser nor that defendant was absolved from the general duty of ordinary care toward them." NAVIGABLE WATERS. (What constitutes Navigability.) Va. — In Hot Springs Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Revercomb, 55 S. E. Rep. 580, the court takes up the question as to how large a stream must be in order to be navigable. It is held that a stream is a navigable or floatable one if, by the increased precipitation at seasons, recurring periodically with reasonable certainty, the flow of water will be sufficient to be sub stantially useful to the public for transportation. As a stream can only be said to be a navigable or floatable one when it is capable of being used in its natural state, it was contended that the stream in question was not floatable or navigable as it had not sufficient water in it when in its natural or normal condition, but that in order that the stream could be used for floating logs or for navigation, it was necessary for the volume of water to be increased by melted snows or rains. The court, however, takes the position that the condition of a stream when its volume of water is increased by melted snows or rains is as natural as when it is diminished by drought, and hence such a stream must be regarded as a floatable or navigable one. In support of this conclusion, the court cites numerous cases among which we may mention: Brown v. Chadbourne, 50 Am. Dec. 641: Thunder Bay Booming Co. v. Speechley, 18 Am. Rep. 190; Gaston v. Mace, 10 S. E. 65. The navigability of a stream is rather a question of fact than of law. As to what constitutes a navigable stream, the principal case is in accord with the great preponderance of state decision. An occasional navigability brought about by unusual freshets is not enough. But on the other hand a navigability due to stages of high water recurring with sufficient regularity to be reasonably anticipated is sufficient to impart the character of navigability, though for long periods of low water it may be suspended. See the note to Gaston v. Mace, 5 L. R. A. 392. The federal courts, however, in declaring what
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constitutes navigable waters of the United States, have not gone so far. And the consequence of thus attaching the character of navigability to every insignificant stream that may occasionally float a log is serious; for such a stream at once becomes subject to the admiralty jurisdiction and to the federal statutes forbidding the obstruction of such streams. The jurisdiction of Congress over them at once becomes supreme, and supersedes state legislation. Hence in the leading case of Leovy v. U. S. 177 U. S. 621, 20 S. Ct. 797 (not cited in the principal case), the Supreme Court, moved by these consider ations, held that mere capacity to pass over a stream in a boat is not sufficient to constitute it a navigable water of the United States, but that the term has reference to commerce of a substantial and permanent character to be conducted thereon. And it sustained the right of Louisiana under the police power to dam a small bayou or crevasse used only by fishermen. See also Hughes, Admy., p. 11. Artificial as well as natural water-ways are navigable waters of the United States. In Boyer ezp. 109 U. S. 629, admiralty jurisdiction was upheld over an artificial canal entirely within the limits of Illinois, and the court took judicial notice of the fact that the canal was 96 miles long, 60 feet wide, and 6 feet deep. R. M. H. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS. (Authority to Practice.) R. I. — State v. Hefferman, 65 Atl. Rep. 284. is a prosecution for practicing medicine without authority. It appeared that defendant had advertised that he had opened offices at a certain number, for the practice of Dermatology and Physical Education in the cure of every and all manner of diseases on the inside or outside of the human body; that he was also authorized by law to teach the science of healing; that he had cured certain diseases; that consultation and advice was free, the only charge being for " ElectroMagnetic Nerve Food " and work done. Wit nesses testified that they or their friends had consulted defendant, been examined by him, had been given treatments by being rubbed with the nerve food, and had paid for the treatments and medicines. Defendant admitted that he had no certificate of medical education, but showed a certificate of incorporation to himself and certain persons for the purpose of teaching and promoting Dermatology and Education, aiding and caring for the sick, and admitted that he had sold a so-called nerve food and had applied it to patients. This evidence, the court held, showed that defen dant had practiced medicine in violation of law. PROPERTY. (Dower.) Ia. — A contention was made in Pierce v. O'Neil, 109 N. W. Rep. 1082, that the right to dower was not barred by
