320
THE GREEN BAG
which he had already been tried and convicted. The court referred to the case of Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234, 30 L. Ed. 425, and held that under the proper construction of the deci sion therein rendered, and of the acts of Congress bearing on the subject, no one should be "de tained" for a crime other than that for which he was extradited here, for the purpose of future trial or punishment for a past conviction. INSURANCE. (Accident Policy.) Mass.— Lewis v. The Brotherhood Accident Company, 79 N. E. Rep. 802, involved the construction of a clause in an accident policy limiting insurer's liability, the terms of which were that in the event of any accidental bodily injury, fatal or non-fatal, contributed to. or caused by . . . drowning or shooting, when the facts and cir cumstances of the accident and injury are not established by the testimony of an actual eye witness, . . . then, and in every such case, the limit of the liability of the company shall be onetwentieth of the accidental death benefit pro vided for in the policy. The evidence in the present case showed that insured, along with a young lady, was canoeing on a river, and that there were two witnesses in a skiff on the river, rowing in an opposite direction. The occupants of the canoe recognized the witnesses on passing, and otherwise showed themselves to be in good spirits. Upon the canoe passing around a bend in the river, the witnesses heard a cry, but did not turn back. Later in the day the upturned canoe was found, and various articles which were in the canoe were found floating near. The insurance company defended the action on the policy on the ground that there was no eyewit ness to the accident within the provision of the accident policy, and hence that they were liable only for one-twentieth part of the death benefit. The court, in holding that the witnesses were, as within the accident policy, sufficient eyewit nesses to the accident, cited the case of National Accident Association v. Rallstin, 101 Ill. App. .192, and considered that it was the only case in which such question had received judicial atten tion. That case was one of shooting, and the injury was not fatal, and it was held in such case that the plaintiff, who was the injured person, was an eyewitness to his own injury. INTEREST. (Insanity of Creditor.) Pa. — In Gorgas v. Saxman, 65 Atl. Rep. 619, an interest ing question is presented as to the liability to pay interest on a debt not paid because the debtor believed the creditor was insane. The interest was claimed on installments due on a mortgage. The mortgagor claimed that before
the payments were made, he received notice that he should not pay the mortgagee because he was of unsound mind, and not competent to transact business. Acting on such information, he called in person on the mortgagee in company with a physician, and having satisfied himself that the mortgagee was not of sound mind did not either tender the amount of the money then due or make any further arrangement in reference to its payment. It was contended that what was done was equivalent to a tender, and that interest should not be charged since the date of the dis covery of' the alleged inability of the mortgagee to receive payment. It was urged that the good faith of the mortgagor in making an effort to ascertain the mental condition of the mortgagee, and in relying on such information, was shown by the subsequent proceedings instituted under Act June 25, 1895 (P. L. 300), in which the mortgagee was found to be of weak mind and a guardian was appointed. The court stated that a pro ceeding -under the provisions of such act was different in scope and character from one de lunaiico inquircndo, and that it was intended for the protection of persons unable to care for their own property and was not so far reaching as a proceeding in lunacy. The court concludes "that so far as the record shows, no legal reason appears why the mortgagor would not have been justified in making payment to the mortgagee, and if such payment had been made and the record properly receipted, it would have been held to be a good acquittance. Again, if the mortgagor thought he could not safely make payment to the mortgagee and had desired to stop interest, he could have asked leave to pay the money into court, and permission so to do would have relieved and fully protected him." MONOPOLIES. (Shipping.) U. S. C. C, S. D. N. Y. — The applicability of the Sherman Anti trust Law to foreign commerce was passed upon in Thomson v. Union Castle Mail S. S. Co., 149 Fed. Rep. 933. Defendants were vessel owners who had entered into a combination for the pur pose of controlling the carriage of freight between New York and South African points. Whenever a vessel of a competing line arrived in New York for the purpose of taking on a cargo for the African points reached by vessels of defendants, the latter put in berth for loading what was called a ' ' fighting vessel. ' ' and made rates as low as or lower than that of the competing vessel, and apportioned the space among their regular patrons. A circu lar was issued by defendants in which they prom ised a rebate to shippers who would send no freight over competing lines and who would ship nothing to dealers who received cargoes from
