NOTES OF RECENT CASES and commercial or industrial establishments; (3) goods, wares and merchandise, in which latter case the law of trade-marks has also to be considered. The right to use one's name or title is the right to the exclusive use of such name or title as against everybody that has not also the right to the use of the same. One using the name without right can not, however, be taken into court and mulcted in damages unless it can also be shown by plaintiff that he has sustained at least nominal damages. It follows that, as a matter of practice as well as law, the name or title of the emperor when given by an owner to his ship will be registered by the proper officer without any difficulty, and that regardless as to whether previous permission to use the name has been obtained. Such permission is, as a rule, nearly always applied for, chiefly because the owner's so cial prestige is greatly enhanced by. reason of the imperial assent, which is rarely, if ever, refused. When it comes to the naming of hotels and indus trial establishments, the custom of the country — more powerful than written laws and paragraphs of the Code — has always permitted the use of such names as " Hotel zum Kaiser Wilhelm," " Hotel zum Kronprinzen," " Restaurant Prinz Heinrich," and " Kaufhaus Hohenzollern," names familiar to all tourists in Germany. It is only when the name is either expressly calculated or else likely to mis lead the public, either as to the nature or extent of the business or the personal relationships of the owner, that names such as these could possibly be come unlawful. Finally, as to goods, wares, and merchandise, section 4 of the law of trade marks — Gesetz zum Schutze der Warenbezeichnungen — provides that three enumerated classes of names may not be registered, but is silent as to the name or title of the sovereign. A later section of the same law, s. 14, provides that if anyone, knowingly or from gross negligence, unlawfully uses the name of another he shall be liable to the party injured in damages: also, where the wrong was done know ingly, to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding six months. What is forbidden is the creation of an impression as if the wares sold stood in some spe cial connection with the party whose name is used, to the injury of such party, but it is only the bearer of that name that can sue, and the sovereign forms no exception. In view of this state of the law professional opinion as expressed in the law magazines of Ger many just to hand, considers as legally untenable a recent decision of a county court of the empire declaring unlawful the assumption of the name of "Hohenzollern " by a company engaged in the manufacturing of automobiles, especially as that decision professes to have been reached under sec tion 12 of the Civil Code. W. E. WALZ.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Property — Water Courses.) N. J. — The growth of our cities pre sents grave problems in securing adequate water supply for the population of such cities, and es pecially so in case of cities located near state boundary lines. The state of New Jersey has passed an act whereby it is made unlawful for any persons or corporations to transport through pipes, conduits, etc., the water of any fresh water lake, pond or stream of the state into any other state. The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 65 Atl. 489. The constitutional objections are taken up by the court and as to the disposition thereof we quote from the opinion: " It is insisted the act in question is unconstitutional: First, as contraven ing the first section of the Bill of Rights contained in our state Constitution, which declares that all men have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, etc. In our view, how ever, this clause does not guaranty to any man the right of acquiring property in anything that is not the subject of private property by law, nor the right of disposing of property that has not been duly acquired under the law of the land. It is argued that, while the act does not prohibit the owner of water from selling it to another person or corporation within this state, it absolutely prohibits him from selling it to any person or cor poration without the state, to be used without the state. The answer is that the act, properly con strued in subordination to the Constitution, does not prohibit the owner of water from selling it where he will; what it prohibits is the acquisition of ownership in flowing waters for the purpose of transporting them out of the state. Secondly, it is objected that the act contravenes the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. To this the like answer may be made. Thirdly, the appellant cites article 4, §2, of the Federal Constitution, that, ' The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privi leges and immunities of citizens in the several states.' It may be a sufficient answer to this to say that the appellant is a citizen of this state, and cannot be heard to plead the privilege of a citizen of any other state. But, besides, it is clear that the statute does not discriminate between citizens of different states; its prohibition is aimed at all persons, whether citizens of this state or of any other state, who may presume to do the pro hibition act. Certainly it is not within the in tendment of the constitutional clause that citizens of the state of New York, while resident there, shall have all the privileges that they would enjoy
