448
THE GREEN BAG
to entertain him on the night in question and was not guilty of any negligent misconduct in refusing him lodging or in sending him home under the circumstances disclosed. In support of this contention, he relied on the case of Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649, 72 Pac. 281, 69 L. R. A. 513, wherein it is said that though feelings of kindness and sympathy may move the Good Samaritan to minister to the sick and wounded at the roadside, the law imposes no such obligation, and suffering humanity has no legal complaint against those who pass by on the other side. This the court concedes is no doubt a correct statement of the general rule, but maintains that the rule in such narrow sense by no means controls a case like the one above. The facts of this case the court holds bring it within the more comprehensive principle that whenever a person is placed in such a position with regard to another, that it is obvious that it he does not use due care in his own conduct he will cause injury to that person, the duty at once arises to exercise care commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds himself, and with which he is confronted, to avoid such danger, and a negligent failure to perform the duty renders him liable for the consequences of his neglect. In support of this position, the court cites Barrows on Negligence, 4, 304; 2 Thompson on Negligence, 1702; Heaven v. Pender, 11 L. R. Q. B. Div. 496; Railway Co. v. Marrs, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 388, 85 S. W. 188, 70 L. R. A. 291. ItEGLIGENCE. (Release.) Wis. — The doc trine that a sole beneficiary of a claim for the death of one person by the act or default of another, under Lord Campbell's Act, has power to make a valid and binding settlement with the wrongdoer, notwithstanding the fact that any action for such damages must be brought by the personal representative of the deceased, is reit erated in McKeigue v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., no N. W. Rep. 384, wherein the court further holds that such settlement and release by the beneficiary will bar a subsequent action by the administrator of the deceased where the estate is otherwise sufficient to pay all claims against it. In support of this holding the court cites Vail v. Anderson, 61 Minn. 552, 64 N. W. 47; Foote v. Foote, 61 Mich. 181, 28 N. V. 90; Johnson v. Longmire, 39 Ala. 143; Walworth v. Abel, 52 Pa. 370; Woodhouse v. Phelps, 51 Conn. 521. PROPERTY. (Restriction — Garage.) Mass. — A garage is, in Evans v. Foss, 80 N. E. Rep. 587, held under the facts to come within the restriction of a deed preventing the erection of a building which would be " offensive to the neighborhood for dwelling houses." The garage proposed to be
erected was designed to accommodate about 125 automobiles of the larger type. A part of one story was designed for a repair shop, and it was intended to place in the building a portable forge. Demonstration cars were to be kept, with demonstrators to run them, and it was expected to store 75 to 100 automobiles in the garage, such machines to go in and out an average of once a day. STREET RAILROADS. (Rules.) Tenn. — A rule of a street railway company fixing $5.00 as the limit on the amount of change it will under take to furnish passengers is in Knoxville Traction Company v. Wilkerson, 99 S. W. Rep. 992, up held as reasonable. Street railroads are con structed and operated in cities and intended to furnish frequent, speedy, and cheap trans portation. To effect this purpose, they are required to have many lines and numerous cars and employees. Their patrons are numerous and they cannot, with convenience to themselves or the public, provide for the sale of tickets or require them of passengers. The fare usually charged is a uniform one for all parts of the city, and the amount is a matter of common knowledge or it can be ascertained by any one proposing to take a car. In Barker v. Central Park N. & E. R. Co., 151 N. Y. 237, 54 N. E. 550, 35 L. R. A. 489, 56 Am. St. Rep. 626, a rule fixing the maximum amount of change at $2.00 was held reasonable. TORTS. (Interference with Employment.) Minn. — The right of a person to recover damages from another because the latter has without excuse or justification induced an employer to refuse the first-named person employment, is upheld in Joyce v. Great Northern Ry. Co., no N. W. Rep. 975. Plaintiff in this case was em ployed by a union depot company whose depot was used by defendant. While in such employ ment plaintiff was injured by one of defendant's engines. After his recovery, on reporting to the depot company for work which had been promised him, plaintiff was informed that he would not receive employment except on condition that he release defendant from all claim for damages on account of his injury. The depot company imposed this condition at the request of defend ant's claim agent. The court first takes up the question whether the right of action in this case was against the depot company or the defendant, a wrongful intermeddler. The court cites numer ous cases to show that nearly all the courts now sustain the doctrine that an action ex delicto will lie against the mischievous wrongdoer who procures a breach of a contract. Queen v. Leatham, App. Cases [1901] 495; Lumley v.
