NOTES OF RECENT CASES for it is the province of the state, by its legislature, to adopt such a policy as it deems best, provided it does not in so doing come into conflict with the Constitution of the State or the Constitution of the United States. There is no such conflict in the case at bar. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Nuisance, Action by State). U. S. Sup. Ct. — In State of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company, 27 S. C. Rep. 618, the United States Supreme Court lays down the proposition that foreign corporations will be enjoined at the suit of the state of Georgia from so discharging sulphurous fumes from their works in Tennessee as to pollute the air over large tracts of territory in Georgia, and to cause and threaten wholesale damage to forests and vegetable life therein, if not to health. When the states by their union made the forcible abatement of out side nuisances impossible to each, they did not tncreby agree to submit to whatever might be done. They did not renounce the possibility of making reasonable demands on the ground of their still remaining quas /-sovereign interests; and the alternative to force is a suit in the United States Supreme Court. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U. S. 208, 45 L. Ed. 497, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231In writing the opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes says: "It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of the sovereign that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by sul phurous acid gas, that the forests on its moun tains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be endangered from the same source." He is of the opinion that the state may be granted relief notwithstanding the hesitation that the court might feel if the suit were between private parties, and the doubt whether, for the injuries which they might be suffering to their property, they should not be left to an action at law. Mr. Justice Harlan concurs in the result, but he is of the opinion that the suit when instituted by the state stands on the same footing as if it was instituted by an individual. He says: " If this were a suit between private parties, and if, under the evidence, a court of equity would not give the plaintiff an injunc tion, then it ought not to grant relief, under like circumstances, to the plaintiff, because it happens to be a state, possessing some powers of sover eignty. Georgia is entitled to the relief sought not because it is a state, but because it is a party which has established its right to such relief by proof."
497
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Police Power). U. S. C. C. A. 6th. Cir. — The validity of a Kentucky statute creating a state racing commission and regu lating the racing of running horses is upheld in Grainger i'. Douglas Park Jockey Club, 148 Fed. 513. The statute while exempting from its provisions trotting meetings or races and races conducted by fair associations, prohibits the conducting of any running race in the state except by a corporation or association licensed by the state racing com mission, which is empow-ered to grant and reject such licenses, to adopt regulations for racing which must be observed by licenses, and to fix the time in each year during which any association may conduct racing, which must be betw-een the first of April and the first of December, its action in certain matters to be subject to review by the courts. This statute while it may operate to deprive persons or corporations of their liberty or property and to create discriminations, the court is of the opinion cannot be held to have any real and substantial relation to the public welfare, nor to be in violation of the 14th amendment of the Constitution, as denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. In the opinion a large number of cases bearing on the question are cited and exhaustively reviewed. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (State Regulation of Connecting Carriers). U.S. Sup. Ct. — An order of the North Carolina Corporation Commission, requir ing the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company to restore the connection at Selma with a train of the Southern Railway Company, which afforded the principal means of travel between the eastern and western parts of the state, is, in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company v. North Carolina Corporation Commission, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, held to be not so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a denial of due process of law or to a deprivation of the equal protection of the law, if other connec tions are inadequate for the public's convenience, although the compliance with the order may necessitate operating an extra train at a loss, or extending, with like result, the run of a local train, so long as the income of the railroad com pany, from its business in the state, affords adequate remuneration after allowing for any possible loss resulting from the operation of the train. The court draws a distinction between the case at bar and the cases in which it has been held that a statute or order fixing unremunerative maximum rates is invalid on the ground that property is taken without due process of law in violation of the Federal Constitution. In the case of a statute or order fixing a schedule of rates which prove unremunerative, it necessarily
