NOTES OF RECENT CASES DOMESTIC RELATIONS. (Adoption, Religion). Mass. — The right of a mother to have her child brought up by foster-parents in her religious faith is exhaustively considered in Purinton v, Jamrock, 80 N. E., 802. The court announces it as the general policy of the Commonwealth to secure to those of its wards who are children of tender years, the right to be brought up, when this is practicable, in the religion of their parents. But in a case such as the one at bar, which involved the adoption of a child, the court says that it is not the rights of the parent that are chiefly to be considered. The first and paramount duty is to consult the welfare of the child. The wishes of the parent as to the religious education and sur roundings of the child are entitled to weight; if there is nothing to put in the balance against them, ordinarily they will be decisive. If, how ever, those wishes cannot be carried into effect without sacrificing what the court sees to be for the welfare of the child, they must so far be dis regarded. The court will not itself prefer one church to another, but will act without bias for the welfare of the child under the circumstances of each case. This is the fair consensus of judicial opinion, although a difference 01 circumstances has caused the use of different expressions and the reaching of different results in the different cases. As was said in substance in F. v. F. [1902] 1 Ch. 688, the parents' religion in prima facie the infant's religion, and the infant should be brought up in that religion and protected against disturb ing influences from persons of a different religious faith; but the infant's welfare must be first of all regarded and its requirements must be treated as paramount. See Stoneton v. Stoneton, 8 De G., M. & G. 760; Davis v. Davis, 10 W. Rep. 245; In re Nevin [1892] 2 Ch. 249; McGrathu. McGrath [1892] 2 Ch. 496, s. c. on appeal, [1893] 1 Ch. 143; In re Meades, Ir. R. 5 Eq. 08; Matter of Jacquet, 40 N. Y. Misc. Rep. 575, 82 N. Y. Supp. 986; Matter of De MarceUin, 24 Hun. (N. Y.) 207; Matter of Turner, 19 N. J. Eq. 433. EQUITY (Unfair Trade). U. S. C. Ct., R. I. — In Moxie Nerve Food Company v. Modox Com pany, 152 Fed. Rep. 493, the court lays down the proposition that a maker of a proprietary medicine, seeking the aid of a court of equity in the protec tion of his trade-mark rights should be required, as a part of its affirmative case, to allege and prove that its preparation is what it purports to be, there being no presumption that such repre sentations are true upon which a court can act. The court says: " If a complainant seeks pro tection in the sale of bottled goods, he should be willing to swear that his bottles contain what he
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represents to the public that they contain, and that his goods are in fact what tney are sold for. If a complainant in a bill of equity should allege, ' I am selling to the public under a certain trade mark an article which I represent to the public as fig syrup,' such a bill, in my opinion, should be demurrable on the ground that the complainant has no right to protection in a mere business of making representations to the public, but only in a bona fide business of selling an article for what it is in fact. A court of equity should not extend protection to a business of selling medicine for paralysis or other serious diseases simply upon proof that the preparation is a harmless beverage with some slight tonic properties. Missouri Drug Co. v. Wyman (C. C.) 129 Fed. 623, 629. INSURANCE (Rebates). Wis. — Various states have enacted statutes prohibiting the giving of rebates by life insurance companies. Wis consin has such a statute which authorizes a revocation of the company's license in case of a violation of the statute. The effect of this statute on the validity of a policy on which a rebate had been given came up for consideration in Laun v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, 111 N. W. Rep. 660, wherein plaintiff sought to recover back the premiums paid. The court after an exhaustive review of the authorities bearing on the question comes to the conclusion that, con sidering the subject matter of the statute, the relation of other nonoffending policy holders to the corporation and its funds, the feature of the statute permitting rebates if written in the policy, and the particular consequences prescribed by the statute for its violation falling only upon one of the parties to the prohibited transaction (the revoca tion of the company's license) the contract of insurance itself was neither illegal nor invalid, and that consequently the insured could not re cover back the premiums paid or any part thereof. MASTER AND SERVANT (Volunteers). N. Y. Sup. Ct. — Bamberg v. International Ry. Co., 103 New York Supplement, 297, was an action by a passenger on a street car to recover for injuries received in a collision with a wagon at a street crossing. It appears that the driver of the wagon had disobeyed instructions of his employers and permitted a boy to drive the team prior to the collision. The boy drove the team at a trot towards the crossing, and seeing he was unable to stop in time to prevent the collision called to the driver, who seized the reins, which had been at all times within his reach, but was unable to stop in time. Under these facts, the court held that the boy at the time of the accident, though not
