546
THE GREEN BAG
Nathan Wolfman in the American Law Review (V. xli, p. 498) on the " Status of a Foreigner Who Has Declared his Intention of Becoming a Citizen of the United States." Examination of the cases leads him to this conclusion. "We thus find that from the point of view of international law, the problem of citizenship which, per se, involves only question of municipal law, has nothing whatever to do with the question of the status of a declarant of intention to become a citizen. That status involves the relation between a nation and one of its subjects and is, therefore, purely a question of international and not of constitutional law, and it follows that a municipal law of one of the States of the United States does not, internationally, affect the status of a declarant. Interna tionally, the declarant of intention to become a citizen owes to the country of his adoption a temporary allegiance resulting from the mere fact of domicile; and the fact that he still owes allegiance to his native country will not prove a difficulty to this proposition. International law in and of itself accords him protection when, for the time being, he leaves this country for another. But it will not accord him this protection as against his first native country, nor as against third countries with which treaties expressly exempt protection. This protection as to third coun tries entitled a declarant to the good offices of the United States in his behalf, but whether it was sufficient to authorize the issuance of a passport to such a declarant, remained in doubt until the passage of the very recent Act of Congress, approved March 2, 1907, which really defined and was declaratory of the already existing international law when it provided that a passport may issue to a person not a citizen of the United States, when such person has made a declaration of intention to become a citizen and has resided in the United States for three years. Such passport will entitle the holder to the protection of this Government in any foreign country, but it will not entitle him to the protection of this Government in the country of which he was a citizen prior to making such declaration of intention." INTERNATIONAL LAW. "War and Private Property," by Norman Bentwich. Boston Book Co, 1907. In view of the fact that the Hague Con ference has before it the question of exempt ing private property at sea from capture contraband excepted, the above is a very timely contribution to the literature of a question which has been not merely an
academic question but one of practical diplomacy for over a century. As stated in the preface, the book is substantially the essay which won the Yorke Prize at Cam bridge University in 1906. The author gives a particularly interesting historical survey of the practice in regard to private property on land and sea. Attention is called to the fact that while in Europe, the rules in regard to the treatment of private property on land have not been administered by any court, those in regard to private property at sea have. In speaking of the greatest single factor in securing respect for life and property in war, he says: " The immediate practical effect of Grotius' work, 'De Jure Belli et Pacis,' was remarkable. In the war of the Paletinate — which was fought while it was being written — pillage and spolisation were carried to their extreme. Gustavus Adolphus, however, who was an enthusiastic admirer of Grotius, made his soldiers pay for everything they took. His remarkable military successes proved that the old practice was as demoralizing for the spoiler as it was ruinous for the spoiled." He points out that not the same progress has been made in the adjective as in the substantive part of international law. " An International Court of appeal on prize cases sitting at the Hague would certainly seem to be one of the most pressing needs of international jurisprudence, and seeing that the questions it would have to decide would be purely legal, it cannot be objected that it would be derogatory to the sovereignty of states." There are passages in which the author's patriotism becomes a trifle rampant, e.g., in speaking of compensation for war losses he says: " England's generous example in the South African war can hardly be regarded as a precedent for future international usages, for few other nations would pursue so enlightened a policy toward their late enemies." His views upon the advisability of exempting private property at sea from capture seem to be warped somewhat by his country's contention for the continuance of the present rule. His argument that private property at sea, " is not only private property but also a part of national com
