NOTES OF RECENT CASES entitled to a reversal for the refusal of the trial court to strike out testimony elicited by a question, though no objection was made to such question. But the court takes the position that the phrase "admission or rejection of testimony " imports judicial action;] that inasmuch as there can be no rejection of testimony until the court has acted on the offer there can be no admission of evidence unless there has been some action taken by the court in admission of the evidence, either on objection or on its own motion. PRACTICE. (Substituted Service.) U. S. C. C. A., 6th Circuit. —■ A vexatious question often arises as to when the United States Circuit Court may obtain jurisdiction of nonresident defendants by substituted service. Those desiring light on this question we refer to an exhaustive note appended to the case of Jones v. Gould, as reported in 80 United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, Reports 1. In this case, it was held that a suit by a member of a syndicate, which was in effect a partnership, to wind up its affairs and for the appointment of a receiver on the ground of the mismanagement by the manager, was not a suit in which jurisdiction could be obtained by sub stituted service, especially since the only alle gation in the bill with respect to property within the district of the court was that the syndicate was the owner of stock in certain railroad com panies therein. STATUTES. (Repeal — Elkin's Law.) U. S. D. C, Ill. — In the March issue of the current volume, we reviewed the decision of Judge Landis of Chicago in the case of United States v. Standard Oil Company, 148 Fed. 719, wherein he held that the Hepburn Act (Act June 29, 1906, c. 3591, }io, 34 Stat. p. 584) did not repeal the Elkin's Act (Act Feb. 19, 1903, c. 708, 32 Stat. 847 [U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1905, p. 599]) in so far as related to an indictable offense incurred under the Elkin's Act., even though prosecution was not commenced until after the passage of the Hepburn Act. The same conclusion was also reached by Judge Morris in the case of United States v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (D. C), 151 Fed. 84, decided shortly after the Standard Oil Company case. The principal ground on which it was contended that prosecu tions' commenced subsequent to the passage of the Hepburn law for offenses incurred under the Elkin's law were barred was, that inasmuch as the Hepburn law contained a clause saving prosecu tions then pending the general saving statute (Rev. St., § 13 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 6]) did not apply. In arriving at the conclusion that the general saving statute did apply, both Judge Landis and
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Judge Morris placed great reliance on the case of Lange v. United States, 133 Fed. 201. 66 C. C. A. 255. In that case Judge Barker held that section 13 applied, notwithstanding a saving clause similar to the one found in the Hepburn Act was found in the statute then under consideration. Judge Grosscup concurred with Judge Barker in his decision, but upon different grounds, while Judge Jenkins dissented. 'In the Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. case, Judge Lochran, who sat with Judge Morris, at the hearing on demurrer, but took no part in the decision, expressed a view contrary to that of Judge Morris. The decisions of Judges Landis and Morris are now further fortified by similar decisions by Judge Holt of the Southern District of New York in United States v. Deleware, L. & W. R. Co. (C.C.) 152 Fed. 269, and Judge Hazel of the Western District of New York in United States v New York Central & H. R.R. Co., 153 Fed. 630. Though there is some divergence of views among the federal judges, the decided weight of authority holds section 13 as saving prosecutions for offenses incurred under the Elkin's Act. Until there is a contrary ruling by the United States Supreme Court, this may well be considered settled law in so far as decisions of the federal court of one district are regarded as authority in another district. WILLS. (Testamentary Capacity — Evidence.) Mich. — O'Dell v. Goff, 112 N. W. Rep. 736, was a will contest case involving the testamentary capacity of a spiritualist. The mere belief in spiritualism the court holds was not evidence of insanity, but, on the other hand, one who thinks so persistently on the subject as to become a monomaniac, incapable of reasoning, does not possess testamentary capacity, and where a believer in spiritualism has such confidence in spiritualistic communications through mediums or otherwise that he is compelled to follow them blindly his free agency is destroyed and a will made under such circumstances cannot be admitted to probate, whether such conclusion be based on incapacity or undue influence. In this case, the court held that it was proper for the trial judge to exclude testimony tending to prove the truth of spiritualism and improper to admit testimony tending to prove it untrue, as the truth or falsity of the spiritualistic faith was not at issue in the suit. For the same reason it was improper for contestants' counsel to suggest during the taking of the testimony and to argue at the conclusion of the testimony that spiritualism was untrue. Neither should witnesses have been permitted to testify that testator was a mono maniac merely because he believed in spiritualism.
