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EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT severely the manner in which the judges reached the decision. American lawyers are especially interested in the prominent place given in the discussion to the constitutional decisions of supreme court of the United States, especially the doctrine of the " immun ity of instrumentalities," laid down in McCulloch v. Maryland. In an earlier case the High Court of Australia had declared this principle applicable to the relation of commonwealth and state both because of its inherent reason ableness, and because looking to the history of the commonwealth constitution and the knowledge of the interpretation which like provisions had received in the United States, it was proper to infer an intention that the commonwealth constitution should receive like interpretation. Before the High Court was instituted the Supreme Court of Victoria had expressly rejected the applicability of McCulloch v. Maryland to Australia, having regard to the different history of the two countries, the particular provisions of the commonwealth constitution as to conflict of power, and finally (and in the opinion of the Chief Justice, princi pally) because the doctrine of implied restraints which might be justified as a matter of political expediency when there was no supervising and controlling authority capable of prevent ing abuses of power by either government, was not necessary in a constitution where both governments are subject to the power of a common authority, the Crown, expressly vested by the constitutions of commonwealth and state with the power of disallowing legis lation. The court also considered that the Privy Council had in Bank of Toronto v. Lambe, 1887, 12 App. Cas. 575, rejected the doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland in the case of the constitution of Canada upon grounds which would involve its rejection in Australia. The Privy Council has now overruled the doctrine of the High Court as to the implied restraints on the power of a state parliament, basing its decision or differences between the constitution of Australia and the United States. The limits of this department forbid giving Mr. Moore's strictures on the decision and an abstract would not do them justice. Students of constitutional law will find his discussion of great interest.

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Common Law of the United States). "The Common Law Jurisdiction of the United States Courts," by Alton B. Parker, Yale Law Journal (V. xvii, p. 1). Arguing with much force Judge Parker's well-known opinion that there is a federal common law, and that it was entirely competent to correct the abuses of interstate commerce had the federal law officers attempted to enforce it. "But the campaign against the govern mental plan of the Fathers is on and has been for several years. It has for its leader the most accomplished politician of our history. Behind him and backing him stand these great corporations of the country which are engaged in interstate commerce and insurance. The reason is that it is easier to deal with one government than with many. It is not their purpose to submit proposed amendments of the constitution to the people as the constitu tion provides — a procedure with which no one could find fault, as it offers an opportunity for discussion before the people prior to their action. Rather it is their scheme to accom plish the centralization of power by uncon stitutional, and therefore dishonest methods. These include : (1) Congressional legislation assuming powers not granted, but expressly retained either to the states or the people; (2) Executive exercise of powers not granted, and the seizure in one form or another of powers belonging to other departments of government; and (3) The substitution of stat utes for common law. , "Statutes are inflexible and cannot be expanded by judicial decisions. Legislators and executives, therefore, who are filled with the desire to control and regulate men and affairs, find in a statute the ideal method of accomplishing their wishes. The objection to an over-abundance of legislation by those who desire justice, rather than personal con trol, is that the men who draft the statutes cannot forsee the cases that will arise which do not come within the letter of the statute. It is for the opposite reason that the common law is so dear to the hearts of all students of it. It is flexible. It cau be made applicable to every new condition which may arise and in every instance can be worked out according to the eternal principles of justice.