A CODE OF LEGAL ETHICS nevertheless considered them for what they professedly are, codes adopted by State Bar Associations as expressions of the standards of ethics which should be adopted and observed by members of the Bar. Considered from this standpoint alone, and without regard to their efficiency against wilful or ignorant offenders, it still seems that they might be substantially improved. In the first place they appear to be alto gether too specific. The modern tendency of legal thought, as illustrated in New York, and doubtless also elsewhere, is to disregard principles for specific instances. This seems to be the result of codification of the law and mo.dem methods of legal instruction. The object of a code of ethics is to instill prin ciples of conduct adequate to any case that may arise. A thousand concrete cases may be selected and the solution given, yet, if no principle is stated, or deducible from the in stances, the one-thousand"-and-first will pre sent to the inquiring mind a still unsolved problem. The typical code also seems faulty in the following, additional particulars: it is argu mentative; it covers subjects which in some instances are governed by statutes or decisions, and is at variance with the statutes or decisions; it is inapplicable to the conditions in certain states even in its particular instances; it suggests too close a consideration of purely local conditions not prevalent elsewhere; some of its pro visions appear to advocate views of doubt ful soundness; and some of the language seems to be unnecessarily grandiloquent. An argumentative canon appears to the writer to be faulty, because it intimates that the conclusion is or may be erroneous. If it needs argument to demonstrate its force, that force is weakened to the extent that the argument is introduced into the canon. Argument is rarely convincing to all minds; it suggests doubt, it intimates a contrary argument of some force, and canons, once adopted, should have an ex cathedra form.
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In several of the states, the specific canons are preceded by preliminary and explanatory statements of general princi ples: these, however, also seem to contain some features of doubtful utility. Of these paragraph II in the usual Code expresses the high toned morality deemed essential, and comme.nts at length on the tempta tions of the lawyer and the pitfalls and mantraps at every step. It is a quotation from Judge Sharswood. It may be a fact; but it seems to the writer that to dwell on the temptations that beset the practi tioner as the reason for adopting a code of ethics is certainly non-essential, and if it is made to appear that one who does his professional duty is doing an exceptionally worthy act, it affords him a ready and sub stantial excuse if he yields to the temptation which is so graphically described. Accord ingly, without pride of opinion, and not assuming to supersede Sharswood, he ven tured to suggest as a substitute in this par ticular place, the following, as a good intro ductory statement : "Observance of high moral principle is essential to the practitioner of law : it is the official duty of every member of the Bar, not only to cultivate its observance by his own conduct, but jealously to see that it is observed by other practitioners, and that infractions of such principles are reported and properly disciplined by the proper body." To the writer's observation, it is the inaction and disinclination of reputable practitioners that encourages and permits the spread and ravages of the disreputable. They do not deem it their duty to interfere. The one further thing noticeable about the Codes of the various State Bar Associations, is their complete silence as to sanctions. The bar associations are presumably with out substantial power to visit penalties except within their body. Their enact- • ments lack efficient force. One of the noticeable things about the ten command ments is the absence of penalties. In the
