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THE GREEN BAG

CRIMINAL LAW (Probation). " The Proba tion of Offenders, Act 1907: An Appreciation and a Criticism," by Hugh R. P. Gamon, Law Magazine and Review (V. xxxiii, p. 433). EMINENT DOMAIN. " The Effect upon the Exercise of the Right of Eminent Domain of the Intermingling of a Private with a Public Use," by Robert L. McWilliams, Central Law Journal (V. Ixvii, p. 199). EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY. "The Em ployers' Liability Acts and the Assumption of Risks in New York, Massachusetts, Indiana, Alabama, Pennsylvania, Colorado, England and including the Federal Act," by Frank F. Dresser, A.M., of the Massachusetts Bar, 8vo. (V. ii, pp. vi, 630), The Keefe-Davidson Com pany, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1908. In recent years tort litigation has increased enormously; and at the present day it threatens to engage the attention of the law courts almost to the exclusion of every other class of business. A considerable part of the tort litigation consists of cases brought against employers of labor by employees who have been injured in the course of their work. Statutes are being passed, and existing statutes are being amended, further to insure the rights of employees; and decisions of the highest courts are constantly adding to the body of the law. Mr. Dresser's book at its publication in 1902 was one of the earliest and most useful of the legal text books covering this expanding subject, and it made a recognized place for itself. But in a branch of the law such as that of employers' liability which is constantly expand ing and enlarging, a book to remain useful must frequently be brought to date. This has been done with Dresser's " Employer's Lia bility " by the compilation of a new volume called volume two. It cannot be called a second edition. The text of the first edition has been left unchanged. The plan of the author is, by using the same section and page numbers, to make available for users of the original work the decisions and changes in the law since 1902. Volume two, therefore, is in the nature of notes to volume one. The scheme has been well carried out. An exam ination shows that the cases down to January, 1907, have been carefully collected and written into the text. By the use of the two volumes the practitioner may be tolerably sure that he

has covered the cases within the field of employer's liability. It is to be hoped, how ever, that the learned author will find time amid his active professional labors to rewrite the whole work within a few years, combining what he has done, and giving the profession the benefit of his judgment and opinion on the law as it is to-day. S. H. E. F. INTERNATIONAL LAW (War). " Pro fessor Westlake on War," by Thomas Baty, /../,. Magazine and Review (V. xxxiii, p. 451). Disagreeing with Professor Westlake's theory put forth in " International Law, Part II, War," that to constitute war there must be an intent to make war, on the part of at least one party. By this theory no acts of unlawful violence are in themselves war and the seizure by Russia of Bessarabia "as a material guarantee " is expressly instanced. Mr. Baty says: "Would anyone, not an international lawyer, think that one country can forcibly invade the territories of another, occupy its cities, and expel its garrisons, without being at war with it? Would it on the other hand enter into the mind of anybody to conceive that Russia, in such a case, was not intending to ' contend ' with Turkey ' by force? ' When Louis XIV invaded the Palatinate, ' sans que la paix soil rotnpue de noire part,' no such hypocritical expressions of intention to keep the peace could be supposed to outweigh the obvious fact that he was breaking it. "This heresy, which perhaps may be styled the Ludovican (and which has gained much support of late years), of admitting that so long as a state disclaims the idea of going to war it may do what it likes without being at war, unless and until the worm on which it has trodden turns, is particularly dangerous. It is unjust to the assailant — for it brands as brutal violence what should have been lawful war. It is unjust to the assailed — for it gives the assailant all the advantages of neutrality and all the benefits of belligerency. It is unjust to the neutral — for it throws on dim the impossible duty of examining the real intentions of his neighbours. Is it replied that

he assailed state can declare war, or by open

resistance begin it? It can, if it prefers annililation to the infliction of indefinite damage. What is such a privilege worth? An astute